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The Constitution and Sikhs in Britain 
Satvinder S. ~ u s s *  
"All ages of Belief have been Great; 
all of Unbelief have been mean." 
R. W. Emerson. 
How well does the British Constitution protect religious 
freedom? The Sikhs with their uncut hair, beards, and turbans 
have centrally posed this delicate question to one of the 
reputedly most liberal and tolerant countries in the world. 
Sikhism is one of the world's youngest religions, and certainly 
Sikhs in Britain should have few misgivings, as they are able 
to practice their faith as well as anywhere else, and in some 
cases much better. But how much more flexible and 
accommodating can Britain's unwritten Constitution be? And 
may there be lessons here for other countries? The question is 
important both fkom the perspective of being able to provide a 
representative analysis of recurrent problems that Sikhs are 
facing in the world generally, as well as a particular kind of 
religious problem that Britain is having to face with its 
minority communities. 
There are 17 million Sikhs worldwide,' six million of 
whom are settled outside India in places as diverse as East 
Africa, Malaysia, Great Britain, Canada and America in 
distinct communities. In Britain specifically, Sikhs comprise a 
population of 400,000 inhabitants in an ethnic minority 
population of just under three million. Although no town in 
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1. KHUSHWANT SINGH & RAGHU FLU, THE SIKHS (1984). 
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Britain presently has an ethnic minority population of more 
than 50 per cent, this population, which makes up 5.6 per cent 
of the total population, is likely to double to six million in the 
next 40 years. However, these minorities will still remain very 
much a minority, according to the latest census report on the 
subject, and will still be less than 10 percent of the total 
p~pulation.~ As a result, their concerns about cultural and 
religious freedoms are likely to become more-not 
less-pressing and governments are going to come under 
increasing pressure to address such concerns. 
As a Sikh who originates from India, was born in East 
Africa, and now lives in Britain, I confess to having a special 
interest in these issues as issues of civic rights and of the 
Constitution. Yet, the paradox is that a concept of civic rights 
and a Constitution are both unknown and unfamiliar to the 
ordinary person on the street in Britain. The result is that a 
person may well increasingly wish to retain his cultural and 
religious identity as the very essence of his being, and yet find 
no means of articulating or espousing that right through the 
language o r  vehicle of the law. 
I propose that an answer for such countries as Britain lies 
in a Religious Freedom Restoration Act similar to the one 
recently passed in the United  state^.^ The question of 
constitutional reform is presently high on the agenda in 
Britain. Various proposals have been put forth such as a bill of 
rights, a written constitution and the incorporation of the 
European Convention of Human Rights into Britain's domestic 
statuted All of these have merit and there is no doubt that 
some reform is now inevitable. 
But no significant voice has been raised for the passage of 
an ordinary statute in Parliament to deal specifically with the 
most fundamental concern of the ethnic minority communities: 
2. Richard Ford, UICs Ethnic Mnorities Will Double in 40 Years', THE 
TIMES (London), January 20, 1994. 
3. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. ## 2000bb, et. seq. (Supp. V 
1993). 
4. The literature on this subject is burgeoning, but see especially, A.W. 
BRADLEY & KD. EWING, C O N ~ O N A L  AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 415-430 (11th 
ed. 1993); R. DWORKIN, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR BFUTAIN (1990); I N S m  FOR 
PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, A WRITTEN CONSTITU~ON FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM 
(Robert Blackburn ed., 1993); JOSEPH JACONELLI, ENACTING A BILL OF RIGHTS 
(1980); JEFFREY JOWELL & DAWN OLIVER, THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 33-56, 79- 
108 (3rd ed. 1994); DAWN OLIVER, GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 146-168, 
187-217 (Milton Keynes ed., 1991). 
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namely, their right to be themselves and to live by their faith 
without fear of discrimination. Perhaps this is not surprising 
because the protection of individuality, of heterodox opinion, or 
even of eccentric conduct, has not been a fundamental purpose 
of the British system of government as it is in the American 
Constitution. Yet it is clear, in my view, that the passage of a 
simple statute on religious freedoms would be far more 
consistent with the British system of securing rights through 
ordinary legislation5 than either an entrenched bill of rights or 
a written constitution which would require a radical overhaul. 
Incorporation of the European Convention is more appealing 
and an attempt was made earlier this year to pass it as a 
British act in Parliament by the foremost advocate of civil 
rights, Lord Lester of Heme Hill. Introducing the Bill, he 
referred to the Convention as "the jewel in the crown" of the 
Council of Europe which had been included in the domestic 
legislation of every country except Britain and Ireland. Britain 
stands particularly indicted in this because between 1970 and 
1990, the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg 
successfully heard thirty-seven cases against the British 
government on such issues as free speech, equality and fair 
trials, a higher rate than against any other European country. 
Senior judges, including the Lord Chief Justice and Lord 
Taylor, are now in favor of incorporation, but the move has 
been consistently resisted by the Government, most recently as 
being "undesirable and unnecessary in principle and in 
practice.* 
There are certainly provisions in the European Convention 
that would assist the effective protection of religious liberty. 
Namely, Article 9, which protects "the right to fieedom of 
thought, conscience and religion," and the "[flreedom to 
manifest one's religion or beliefs."? It is also the case that 
incorporation would be less controversial than formulating a 
domestic bill of rights where agreement between political 
parties on such issues as the minimum wage and the right to 
belong to a trade union would be very difficult.' 
5. See infia parts III.B.l-6. 
6 .  Kate Chattaway, Lord Chief Justice Urges Adoption of Human Rights 
Law, PRESS AsSW NEWSFILE, January 25, 1995. 
7 .  For a recent account of this see W.  Cole Durham et al., The Future of 
Religious Liberty in Russia, Report of the De Brught Conference on Pending 
Russian Legislation Restricting Religious Liberty, 8 EMORY INT1, L. REV. 16-17 
(1994). 
8.  Anthony Lester, Incorporating the Convention, LEGAL ACTION, April 1990, 
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In fact, even the Council of Europe has urged Britain this 
year to implement the Convention to prevent cases being 
lodged at  Strasb~urg.~ However, the Convention has been 
consistently opposed in government as something alien and 
unnecessary to Britain's Constitutional traditions. Moreover, 
even its chief proponent, Lord Lester, accepts that it is a 
"source of general principles" that "is no substitute for detailed 
and precise legislation on particular topics, such as race and 
sex discrimination . . . ."lo This has been precisely America's 
experience, which is why despite the Religious Clauses of the 
First Amendment, it- drifted inexorably to the passage of the 
detailed Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. 
I believe that the argument is even more compelling in the 
case of Britain, not because it has no protection for such 
freedoms in its Constitution, but because in Britain this is the 
accepted way of doing things." There is, therefore, no 
conceptual or intellectual difficulty. The only difficulty is that 
of deciding to legislate and then of deciding what to include in 
the legislation. 
I believe that Britain has erred fundamentally in this 
respect when it comes to legislating to protect the rights of 
religious minorities, and that unless this error is soon rectified 
through specific legislation, the demands of religious minorities 
will get ever more vocal in the next forty years. I will show 
that what Britain has done is to treat the religious problem as 
a racial problem that can be resolved through the application of 
equality and non-discrimination norms. Consequently, it has 
passed in the last thirty years a series of Race Relations Acts 
which contain no hint of outlawing discrimination on religious 
grounds. l2 
Yet, the reality is that whereas racial minorities are often 
religious minorities, religious minorities are not necessarily 
racial minorities. Consequently, formally neutral and generally 
applicable state laws are more likely to lead to offenses against 
the rights of religious minorities than against racial minorities, 
who are normally only affected if there has been an express 
at 26. 
9. Daniel Tarsychys, the Secretary-General of the 34 nation Council of 
Europe publicly urged the British Government to commit itself to enshrining the 
Convention into domestic law. See THE R M E S  (London), February 15, 1995. 
10. Lester, supra note at 8. 
11. See infra parts III.B.1-6. 
12. See infia parts IV.B.1-3. 
SIKHS IN BRITAIN 
breach of non-discrimination or equality principles." The 
history of the Race Relations legislation, I shall argue, is 
woefully deficient in this respect. 
The question, however, is why Britain has chosen to 
proceed thus. I shall argue that the reasons lie in its own sense 
of insecurity about religion, and in a history strewn with a 
battle-torn period of constitutional crises, during which 
Britain's own right to religious belief was very hard won and 
then confirmed through a series of religious liberty statutes.14 
This sense of religious insecurity is still evident today. For 
example, recently the British government made the teaching of 
Christianity a compulsory part of the state school curriculum at 
the insistence of the House of Lords in an Act that was only 
intended to lay down the essential elements of educational 
syllabuses in the national cumculum, even though most people 
in Britain today would not regard this education to be essential 
to their lives in a secular society.15 To demonstrate the 
reasons for this continued tendency in history, I shall have to 
take the reader through the relevant parts of British history. 
This will then help us to see why the simple passage of a 
detailed religious freedom statute would be the most 
straightforward and efficacious way of securing rights to 
religious freedom. 
My argument is that America had to pass the 1993 
Religious Freedom bstoration Act following the Smith decision 
by the Supreme Court in 1990.16 Britain should have passed a 
similar act immediately after the House of Lords' decision in 
13. The point has been well made in the pages of this journal. See Douglass 
Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 221, 221-258. 
14. See infra parts III.A.B.3. 
15. The Educational Reform Act of 1988 which requires all pupils to take 
part in a daily worship "of a broadly Christian character." See The Educational 
Reform Act of 1988, $5 6, 7. This has been criticized because "[wlith nearly a third 
of the people in this country having no connection with any church or religion, and 
with only a minority attending church, compulsory religion in schools is a 
dishonesty that nobody who has the moral welfare of children at  heart should 
support." See also Letters to the Editor: Religious Education Offers a Touchstone for 
Faith, THE INDEPENDENT, February 2, 1995. Similarly, the Archbishop of York, Dr. 
John Habgood, the Church of England's second most senior figure has questioned 
the need for daily religious assemblies in schools. He said, "It is absolutely clear 
that schools do not create Christians and should not be expected to." John O'Leary, 
Habgood Questions Need for Religious Assembly in Schools, THE TIMES (London), 
January 6, 1995. 
16. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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Mandla in 1983." Smith cried out for legislation because the 
Court held that so long as the law is generally applicable, and 
not discriminatorily aimed specifically at  religion, the 
government may interfere with religion provided that the 
government interest was legitimate. Mandla cried out for 
legislation (and continues to cry  out) for the far more 
fundamental reason that religious discrimination is not 
unlawful in Britain. Parliament has not outlawed it in the Race 
Relations Act 197618 since such discrimination "does not 
constitute a severe burden on members of religious  group^."'^ 
Given this, the only way a Sikh boy, barred from attending a 
private school for wearing his turban, could successfully fight 
his exclusion from the school by the Headmaster was to show 
himself to be subject to discrimination on "ethnic or national" 
grounds. In Mandla, the House of Lords held that he could.20 
After Smith in 1993, American legislation required States to 
provide religious exemptions from generally applicable laws, 
and in essence, mandated religious accommodation unless 
there is found to be a compelling state intere~t.~'  Already a 
Sikh boy in California has been able to successfully rely on this 
law against a school policy prohibiting the possession of knives 
on school property. The District Court held that the school's no- 
knives policy could not be used to ban the possession of 
Kirpans (ceremonial knives) that Sikhs must have on their 
person as an article of their faith?2 Britain has done nothing, 
but should now follow that example, particularly as the 
Mandla case has not only failed to protect other religious 
groups such as Ra~tafar ians,~~ but also other Sikhs in other 
 situation^.^^ 
I believe that adopting or adapting Section 3 of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 has great potential 
in securing religious liberties in Britain because it would, 
under Britain's constitutional principle of parliamentary 
17. Mandla v. Dowel1 Lee, [I9831 2 App. Cas. 548. 
18. See infia part IV.B.3. 
19. Mandla v. Dowel1 Lee, [I9831 2 App. Cas. 548, 568 (Lord Templeman). 
20. See facts of Mandla infia part IV.E. 
21. See Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice 
and Judicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73, 90. 
22. See Cheema v. Thompson, 36 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 1994). I am very 
grateful to Professor Angela Carmella of the Harvard Divinity School for sending 
me a transcript of this judgement soon after it was given. 
23. Crown Service v. Dawkins, 22 Law Society Gazette R.36 (1991). 
24. See infia part IV.E. 
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supremacy which means that Parliament's sovereignty is 
omnipotent and continuing (at least domestically), impliedly 
repeal all earlier inconsistent statutory enactments. Section 3 
reads: 
(a) Government shall not burden a person's exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section. 
(b) Exception: Government may substantially burden a 
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person: 
(I) is in krtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of Mher ing that 
compelling interest.25 
Such an enactment potentially stands to repeal, to the extent of 
their inconsistency with the enactment, earlier seventeenth 
century statutes that are anti-Catholic because a later 
Parliament that is omnipotent and sovereign has legislated 
against the continuance of such discriminatory religious 
practices.26 Of course, it may be argued that this cannot be 
done because those earlier defining statutes of the seventeenth 
century are fundamental law, such as the Bill of Rights of 
1689, the Union with Scotland Acts of 1706 and the Union with 
Ireland Act of 1 8 0 0 . ~ ~  I will address this point in this 
25. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb, et. seq. (Supp. V 
1993). 
26. This is the doctrine of "implied repeal" in British Constitutional law, as 
seen in such cases as Ellen Street Estates, Ltd. v. Minister of Health, [I9341 1 
K.B. 590, 596, where Lord Justice Maugham said in the Court of Appeal: 
The Legislature cannot, according to our constitution, bind itself as to the 
form of subsequent legislation, and it is impossible for Parliament to 
enact that in a subsequent statute dealing with the same subject-matter 
there can be no implied repeal. If in a subsequent Act Parliament chooses 
to make it plain that the earlier statute is being to some extent repealed, 
effect must be given to that intention just because it is the will of the 
Legislature. 
Id. at  597 (Maugham, L.J.). 
27. For a discussion of the Union with Scotland Acts see infra part III.B.6. I t  
has been argued that since the Union with Scotland Acts were antecedent to the 
new Parliaments they created, they were constituent Acts bringing into effect a 
new state and a new Parliament. See J.B.D. MITCHELL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND Chapter 1 (1968). But a contrary view is taken by another 
leading constitutional lawyer. See C. MUNRO, STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL AW 
Chapter 4 (1987). The fact is that provisions of allegedly fundamental statutes 
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paper:' but I do not accept that legislation can be 
fundamental in the conventional sense in a system of 
government such as Britain's, and even if it could, surely the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act is just as fundamental as 
any other statute, just as the Race Relations legislation is, and 
just as the European Economic Communities Act of 1972 is, 
and yet each of these affected important changes and each was 
passed in an ordinary legislative process. 
Clearly, therefore, what this tells us is that fbndamental 
changes can be wrought in the British system through the 
passing of a statute.29 Since Parliament is continuously 
omnipotent, it cannot bind the hands of its successors and what 
it decides goes. It would be different if Parliamentary 
supremacy was self-embracing and not continuous because 
then, Parliament could decide each matter only once3' during 
have been amended or repealed (e.g. the Universities (Scotland) Act 1853 and the 
Irish Church Act 1869) and the Union with Ireland was dissolved in 1922 when 
Southern Ireland was given independence. The nature of the Union with Scotland 
Acts has been considered in several Scottish cases but has not been decided. In 
MacCormick v. Lord Advocate, 1953 S.L.T. 255, Ct. of Sess., two members of the 
Scottish public petitioned the Court of Session for a declaration that a 
proclamation describing the Queen as "Elizabeth the Second of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain" was illegal. The Lord President (Cooper) held that 
there is neither precedent nor authority of any kind for the view that the 
domestic Courts of either Scotland or England have jurisdiction to 
determine whether a governmental act of the type here in controversy is 
or is not to conform to the provisions of a Treaty, least of all when that 
Treaty is one under which both Scotland and England ceased to be 
independent states and merged their identity in an incorporating union. 
Id. 
Similarly, in Gibson v. Lord Advocate, 1975 C.M.L.R. 563, Lord Keith declared, 
"Like Lord President Cooper I prefer to reserve my opinion on what the position 
would be if the United Kingdom Parliament passed an Act purporting to abolish 
the Court of Session of the Church of Scotland." 
In Ex parte Canon Selwyn, 36 J.P. 54 (1872), the question was raised whether 
the Irish Church Act 1869 was validly passed because this Act disestablished and 
disendowed the Episcopal church in Ireland, and yet, Article 5 of the Treaty of 
Union with Ireland in 1800 had established it forever. It was argued that the Act 
of 1869 was contrary to the Coronation Oath and Act of Settlement 1700 (both 
discussed i n h  parks III.B.2, III.B.5). Chief Justice Cockburn held that "there is no 
judicial body in the country by which the validity of an act of parliament could be 
questioned." In my view, this is all-revealing, for it is clear that Parliament may 
through its sovereignty repeal any act at any time, and there is no statute that 
hierarchically ranks above another in the British system of government. 
28. See supra note 27 and infin parts III.B.l-6, where some of the so-called 
"fundamental" statutes are discussed in detail. 
29. See supra note 27 and infi-a parts III.B.l-6. 
30. H.L.A. Hart explained that the English doctrine of Parliamentary 
Supremacy is nothing more than a "rule of recognitionn employed by the Courts to  
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its life-time of five years. It is clear, therefore, that religious 
freedoms in Britain can be secured for the Sikhs by a simple 
legislative enactment, until such time that more radical 
constitutional reform arrangements can be brought into effect. 
I will now consider why the Sikhs, as a community in 
Britain, need such legislation. To make out a case for this, we 
must first consider Sikhism as a Sikhism in 
Britain,32 the nature of Britain's ~onst i tut ion,~~ Britain's 
historical treatment of religious freedom,34 and Britain's 
contemporary protection of the religious rights of Sikhs.35 
Then we can determine what Britain must do to better protect 
the religious liberties of its Sikhs and other minority 
religions .36 
Sikhism is an established minority religion in India where 
it is followed by eleven million people. It is doctrinally distinct 
as a faith3' fkom other religions such as Hinduism and Islam 
identify valid rules of law. He said: 
the formula "Whatever the Queen in Parliament enacts is law* is an 
adequate expression of the rule as to the legal competence of Parliament, 
and is accepted as an ultimate criterion for the identification of law. The 
requirement that at  every moment of its existence Parliament should be 
free from legal limitations including even those imposed by itself is, after 
all, only one interpretation of the ambiguous idea of legal omnipotence. I t  
in effect makes a choice between a continuing omnipotence in all matters 
not affecting the legislative competence of successive parliaments, and an 
unrestricted self-embracing omnipotence the existence of which can only be 
enjoyed once. These two questions of omnipotence have their parallel in 
two conceptions of an omnipotent God: on the one hand, a God who a t  
every moment of His existence enjoys the same powers and so is 
incapable of cutting down those powers, and, on the other, a God whose 
powers include the power to destroy for the future His omnipotence. 
Which form of omnipotence - continuing or self-embracing - our 
Parliament enjoys is an empirical question concerning the form of rule 
which is accepted as the ultimate criterion in identifying the law. 
Hart has no doubt if the present rule is that of continuing sovereignty, then 
Parliament "cannot protect its statutes from repeal." See H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 145-56 (1961). In my view, this reaflhns that those statutes 
cannot be fundamental under the present system. 
31. See infra part I. 
32. See infia part 11. 
33. See infia parts III., 1II.A. 
34. See infia parts 1II.B-III.B.6. 
35. See infia part IV. 
36. See infia part V. 
37. The best works on Sikhism are JOSEPH D. CUNNINGHAM, A HISTORY OF 
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which have been followed in India for hundreds of years. It is 
necessary to give a brief description of Sikhism here for two 
reasons: first, to help explain the basic tenets of the faith to the 
general reader who may not be wholly familiar with the Sikhs, 
and in so doing, show how those tenets have, over time, in 
their history, helped constitute the Sikhs as a distinct people3' 
and a nation; second, to show from this brief history how 
important sensitive treatment by the law is to religious 
minorities who have been so defined by their history and by 
their culture. 39 
Such minorities, wherever they are, will by definition not 
have the means to secure the protection of their religious 
values through legislative or even judicial process because 
those two agencies will be subject to the determining influences 
of the religious, political and social ideologies of the majority 
faiths in society. A minority faith cannot avail itself of the 
luxury of working through the normal democratic processes. 
That is what makes it a minority. Yet, there is a critical, 
individual element of human dignity in those minorities which 
the law of religious liberty must protect, and which the science 
of law must perfect if it is to gain both respect and 
acceptability from precisely those individuals upon whom it 
irnpa~ts.~' 
The history of the Sikhs bears this out, for it is not the 
culture or the social structure that distinguishes Sikhs from 
their fellow brethren in the region of their origin, but their 
faith that stands them apart and defines them. For law, this 
poses a special challenge. Law has to focus specifically on 
religion, to give vent to religion as a specific individual freedom 
THE SIKHS: FROM ORIGIN OF THE SIKH NATION TO THE BATTLE OF SUTLEJ (1966); 
MAX k MACAULIFFE, SIKH RELIGION - ITS GURUS, SACRED WRITINGS AND 
AUTHORS (1909); COLE w. OWEN & P.S. SAMBI, THE SIKHS: THEIR RELIGIOUS 
BELIEFS AND PRACTICES (1978); KHUSHWANT SINGH, A HISTORY OF THE SIKHS 
(Princeton rev. ed., 1991). The best recent work in the English language is Terence 
Thomas, Old Allies, New Neighbors: Sikhs in Britain, in THE GROWTH OF 
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY, BRITAIN FROM 1945 205-241 (G. Parsons ed., 1993). This 
provides a detailed account of Sikhs in Britain. 
38. The existence of Sikhs as a distinct group in their own right is now 
judicially recognized by the House of Lords, the highest court in Britain. See infra 
text accompanying notes 154167. 
39. Nowhere is this more clear than in the events leading up to the removal 
of Prince Duleep Singh from the Punjab to England, to his conversion to 
Christianity, and to the events thereafter. See infra part 11. 
40. The success of law is ultimately dependent on its consensual acceptance 
by those that it affects. Otherwise, the impact of all law will be limited. 
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in its own right. However well-meaning the intent, if legal 
provisions focus simply and purely on non-discrimination or 
equality norms based on racial categorizations, they are bound 
to miss the mark. The history of the Sikh religion, rich and 
varied as it is, demonstrates this point amply.41 
Sikhism originated in Northern India, in a fertile area 
known as the Punjab, the land of five rivers. The term Sikh 
derives from the ancient Indian classical language, Sanskrit, in 
which the word shishya means "disciple" or "to learn." Sikhs 
learn from their Guru, which means learned teacher. There 
were ten Gurus during the formative years of Sikhism between 
1539 and 1708? Of these, the first, Guru Nanak (1469-1539), 
and the last, Guru Gobind Singh (1666-1708), are the most 
important. Of the ten, only the sixth, Guru Hargobind (1595- 
1644), and the tenth took up arms. They did so while the 
developing egalitarian ideals of the faith began to question the 
existing social and political structure in the Punjab." The 
Moghul Emperors in New Delhi saw this questioning as a 
threat to their authority and resorted to perse~ution.~ The 
sixth Guru took up arms after the fifth, Guru Ajan Dev (1563- 
1606), was burned alive by Emperor Jahangir for refusing to 
convert to Islam.45 The irony is that Jahangir was the son of 
Emperor Akbar, one of the greatest and most enlightened 
rulers the world has ever seen and "who made bigotry 
irnp~ssible."~~ The tenth Guru took up arms after the ninth, 
Guru Tegh Bahadur (1621-1675), was publicly and 
ceremoniously beheaded by Emperor Aurungzeb in the center 
of what is now Old Delhi.47 It seems that "the Moghul Empire 
41. See infra part N on the limitations inherent in the Race Relations 
legislation in this respect and in the House of Lords decision in Mandla. 
42. These were: Guru Nanak (1469-1539); Guru Angad (1504-1539); Guru 
Amar Das (1479-1574); Guru Ram Das (1534-1581); Guru Ajun Dev (1563-1606); 
Guru Hargobind (1595-1644); Guru Har Rai (1630-1661); Guru Harkrishan (1656- 
1664); Guru Tegh Bahadur (1621-1675); Guru Gobind Singh (1666-1708). The term 
"Singh" means "lion* and after the last Guru every Sikh male has this as his 
middle name. Every Sikh female has "Kaur" as her middle name and this means 
"queen." 
43. See the excellent account by Sunita Puri. SUNITA PURI, ADVENT OF SIJSH 
RELIGION (1993). 
44. See M. A m ,  THE CRISIS OF EMPIRE IN MUGHAL NORTH INDIA, AWADH 
AND THE PUNJAB 1707-1748 135, 144, 153, 315 (1986); see also R.P. TRIPATHI, RISE 
AND FALL OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE (1976). 
45. B.S. NIJJAR, PUNJAB UNDER THE MUGHALS (1968); J.N. SARKAR, HISTORY 
OF AUWGZEB (1973); GANDA SINGH, GURU ARJUN'S MARTYRDOM (1969). 
46. K. ARMSTRONG, A HISTORY OF GOD 303 (1993). 
47. See J.S. GREWAL & S.S. BAL, GURU GOBIND SINGH: A BIOGRAPHICAL 
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never recovered from the destructive bigotry he had unleashed 
and sanctified in the name of God,d8 and it was not long 
before under the tenth GUN, Guru Gobind Singh, the Sikhs 
defeated the M o g h ~ l s . ~ ~  Aside from this testing period, the 
faith has remained committed to the pacifist ideals of its 
founder, Guru Nanak, except for the apparent resurgence of 
militancy in modem times." 
Guru Nanak laid down the essential philosophical 
foundations of the faith.51 He set out to simplify and 
democratize religion. He taught that God was personally 
knowable to every man, woman and child through personal 
devotion. He spoke and wrote in the ordinary language of the 
day. He rejected the select priesthood's ritual incantation of a 
sacred Sanskrit text that no one else could easily understand or 
employ and he rejected ritual, icons and sacrifice. He preached 
personal devotion to a personal God. This devotion was 
expressed through meditation (bhakti), the utterance of the 
name of God (Nam), and the singing of hymns (shabads). Any 
person irrespective of sex, status or creed, could achieve 
nirvana or union with God through such personal acts of 
devotion. Similarly, any person, whatever his sex, status or 
creed, could read the sacred text and officiate as priest a t  
religious ceremonies. The sacred text for all Sikhs is called the 
Guru Granth Sahib (literally, the Revered Book Guru). The 
Granth is written in the Punjabi language, the spoken 
language of the Sikhs. It contains 5,894 holy verses in 1430 
pages. Its first correct English translation was undertaken by 
Max Arthur Macauliffe and published by Oxford University 
Press in 1 9 0 9 . ~ ~  It has been described by Miss Pearl S. Buck 
who has said of i t  that: 
STUDY (1967); C.H. LOCHLIN, THE GRANTH OF GURU GOBIND SINGH AND THE 
KHAL~A BROTHERHOOD (1971); DALIP SINGH, GURU GOBIND SINGH AND KHALSA 
DISCIPLINE (1992); KARTAR SINGH, GURU GOBIND SINGH AND THE MUGHALS (1967). 
48. ARMSTRONG, supra note 46, at 304. 
49. See A M ,  supra note 44, for a h l l  account. 
50. A thorough account of this is given by the leading writer of Sikh history, 
Khushwant Singh. KHUSHWANT SINGH, MY BLXEDING PUNJAB (1992). See also 
COLONEL P. BHULLAR, THE SIKH MUTINY (1987). 
51. J.S. GREWAL, GURU NANAK IN HISTORY (1969); S.S. KOHLI, PHILOSOPHY OF 
GURU NANAK (1969): W.H. MCLEOD, GURU NANAK AND THE SIKH RELIGION (1975); 
DEWAN SINGH, GURU NANAK AND THE INDIAN MYSTIC W l T I O N  (1981); GOPAL 
SINGH, GURU NANAK (1967). 
52. See MACAULIFFE, supm note 37. 
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Shri Guru Granth Sahib is a source-book, an expression of 
man's loneliness, his aspirations, his longings, his cry to God 
and his hunger for communications with that Being. I have 
studied the scriptures of other great religions but I do not 
find elsewhere the same power of appeal to the heart and 
mind as I find in these volumes.53 
Written by the first five Gurus until the martyrdom of Guru 
Aqan Dev in 1606 who completed it in 1604, the Granth 
contains the sacred and divinely inspired Word (Shabad) 
uttered by these Gurus from which the disciple gains all 
wisdom. Other Gurus often wrote, and sometimes quite 
copiously, as did the tenth, Guru Gobind, but these writings 
are not included in the ~ r a n t h . ~ ~  
By the time of GUN Gobind Singh the faith had developed 
over nearly two hundred years. It had achieved much of its 
doctrinal objectives. Charity and a sense of communal 
responsibility had been instilled. Sikh temples had been 
established? Sikhs met regularly at  the temple to share a 
common meal (guru-ha-langar) whereby all, no matter king or 
pauper, were bound to sit and eat together on equal terms. In 
congregational terms, this meal is almost as important as 
prayer. Guru Gobind Singh did not seek to elevate himself over 
his disciple Sikhs. He insisted that he was just like them. 
When he died in 1707, he decreed that there should be no act 
of remembrance of him and that all future authority should 
henceforward come from the Guru Granth Sahib and the 
community, with no further living Guru. 
Nevertheless, Guru Gobind's achievements a r e  
considerable, not the least of which being that he left the Sikhs 
in their final physical form, the most striking representation of 
which is the turbaned Sikh male with his uncut hair. Guru 
Gobind's most significant achievement was his foundation in 
1699 of a fellowship of committed devotional believers called 
the Khalsa (or the "Pure Ones"). Each member was initiated 
into the order, the Khalsa Panth, by drinking a sweet nectar 
(amrit) of water and special sugar crystals stirred with a steel 
sword in a steel bowl, by which the initiates assumed the name 
53. G.S. SACHA, THE SIKHS AND THEIR WAY OF LIFE 17 (1988). 
54. Guru Gobind Singh's writings are contained separately in the Dasam 
Granth. 
55. See J.S. GREWAL, FROM GURU NANAK '1'0 MAHARAJAH MJIT SINGH 
(1982). 
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Singh (Lion). Initiates were then to carry five symbols on their 
persons as a continuing affirmation of their faith as the Khalsa 
Sikhs and to ensure that their vows were not forgotten. The 
symbols were: (i) the uncut hair, the Kes, which men must keep 
covered with a turban; (ii) a small comb, Kanga, to keep the 
hair clean; (iii) a steel wrist bracelet, Kara, worn always on the 
forearm; (iv) a short ceremonial dagger, Kirpan, worn 
discreetly; (v) knee length pants or breeches, Kaccha. These 
five symbols are known as the Five Ks." They may be 
interpreted in doctrinal or ethical terms: the steel bracelet may 
symbolize the completeness of faith or remind a Khalsa of his 
vows as he performs daily tasks, and pants may symbolize 
chastity. Terence Thomas has also written that "viewed 
phenomenologically, it is fairly clear that apart fkom the uncut 
hair and beard, the signs reflect the military aspect of the Sikh 
faith, the bracelet being the remnant of the swordsman's wrist 
protector, the knee-length pants the dress of the 
infant~yman."'~ 
~ c c o r d i n ~  to Alam, the tenth Guru "transformed the 
character of the Sikh religion" and "converted it into a militant 
organization? In truth, Sikh worship begins and ends with 
someone uttering "wahe guru ji ka khalsa" ("the Khalsa is 
dedicated to God"). Moreover, militancy or the military aspect 
is not a permanent feature of the Khalsa. It is only justifiable 
in the quest for justice when all else fails. Guru Gobind Singh 
himself viewed the Khalsa as embodying the dualism of the 
saintlsoldier (with the saint coming first) both inwardly and 
outwardly. This view was doctrinally consistent with the 
teachings of Guru Nanak and it is regretful that the saintliness 
is far less commented upon these days than the soldierly 
qualities. 
Nevertheless, the Khalsa is now synonymous with 
Sikhism, and the Khalsa predominates in orthodox Sikhism, 
despite the fact that thousands of Sikhs follow Guru Nanak in 
such sects as the Nirankaris," the Namdharis," and the 
56. DALIP SINGH, GURU GOBIND AND SIKH DISCIPLINE (1992). 
57. Thomas, supra note 37, at 213. 
58. ALAM, supra note 44, at 135. 
59. The Nirankaris were founded by Baba Dyal Singh (1783-1854). They were 
opposed to idolatry, advocated the reform of rituals in birth, marriage and death, 
and were originally limited to urban Sikhs in the north-west. 
60. The Namdharis were founded by Bhai Balak Singh (1799-1862). They led 
simple austere lives, had their own line of Gurus and denounced rituals. They 
SIKHS IN BRITAIN 
Radhaswarni~.~' These Sahajdhari (those who are connected) 
Sikhs do not necessarily wear turbans or keep their hair long. 
They follow a line of living Gurus, unlike the mainstream and 
orthodox Sikhs that we have described above. Sometimes they 
may refer to themselves as Nanakpathis (Nanak sectarians). 
This rich diversity in Sikhism shows the influences on Sikhism 
of both Hinduism and Islam, the two great religions of the 
subcontinent. Yet, it is crucial to understand that Sikhism is 
not a synthesis of these older religions but a new religion in its 
own right expounding a new road to the realization of God.62 
simply repeated the name of God, or Nam, in prayer (hence Nam-dhari) and 
denounced both the claims of superiority and reverence made by the Bedi 
descendants of Guru Nanak and the caste system. 
61. The Radhaswamis were led by a Hindu banker, Shiv Dyal (1818-1878), 
and based their teachings on the lives of the first Gurus in the Guru Granth 
Sahib and rejected the rest. They appealed to the clean-shaven Sikhs in the 
educated classes who were Hindu-oriented or to the Hindus who were Sikh- 
oriented. 
Each one of the these movements started as a reform movement in Sikhism, 
because in the nineteenth century, Sikhism as a creed was very much in decline. 
Hinduism threatened to absorb it, and British rule, coming ten years after the 
death of Maharahah Ranjit, brought with it Christian missionaries. They 
introduced an aggressive brand of proselytism hitherto unknown in the Punjab, 
employing professional preachers and the printing press for mass dissemination of 
their beliefs. See R.A. KAPuR, SIKH SEPARATISM: THE POLITICS OF FAITH (1986). 
These three reform movements, however, were not mainstream movements, and 
in 1873 the Singh Sabha (assembly) was founded after four Sikh students of the 
Amritsar Mission School converted to Christianity. In 1879 a second Singh Sabha 
was set up in Lahore. By 1899, there were over 121 Singh Sabhas which 
organized divans (religious meetings), preached reform, established schools and 
orphanages, and used preachers to spread reformist ideology throughout the 
countryside. Funds came from individual subscriptions and from members of the 
Sikh intelligentsia. The movement was firmly mainstream with a huge dint of 
populism about it. It addressed itself to genuine communal grievances, and reached 
its high-point in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Each Singh Sabha, 
in its own way, generated a robust and flourishing debate about Sikh identity and 
culture in a way hitherto unknown. The result was that the drift to other faiths 
was solidly checked. Since the hallmarks of this movement were educational and 
literary, I have always believed that the protection of Sikh religious freedoms in 
the West can be maintained through a present adoption of the values and practices 
of the Singh Sabha. See Satvinder Juss, A Singh Sabha for the Future?, KHALSA: 
A NEWSLEITER OF THE SIKH & PUNJAB1 SOCIETY, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE 10-20 
(Lent Term, 1988). For information on the Singh Sabha, the reader is referred to: 
S.S. GANDHI, PERSPECTIVES ON SIKH GURDWARAS LEGISLATION (1993); GANDHA 
SINGH, THE SINGH SABHA AND OTHER SOCIO-RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN THE 
PUNJAB, 1850-1925 (1984); MOHINDER SINGH, THE AKALI STRUGGLE (1988). 
62. Western writers, such as Ernest Trumpp and W.H. McLeod, have 
sometimes taken the view that it is. See ~"FULOCHAN SINGH, ERNEST TRUMPP AND 
W.H. MCLEOD, AS SCHOLARS OF SIKH HISTORY, RELIGION AND CULTURE (1994). 
Regrettably, some of the language in this work is immoderate. The reader is more 
readily recommended DARSHAN SINGH, WESTERN PERSPECTIVE ON THE SIKH 
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This can be explained if we look at the social and religious 
background that caused Sikhism to develop in the beginning. 
The roots of Sikhism lie firmly with Guru Nanak. Guru 
Nanak came from the Bhakti movement, which was in turn 
influenced by the Sufis. The Sufis emerged in Persia in the 
tenth century advocating mystical doctrines of union with God 
achieved through the love of God. The Sufis were secretive, 
aloof and lived in seclusion. In India, they founded three main 
orders: Chisti based around Delhi and the Doab and among 
whose members figured the historian Barani and the legendary 
poet Amir Khusrau, Suhrawardi based in the Sindh, and 
Firdausi based in the Bihar. All three orders of Sufis 
dissociated themselves from the established centers of 
orthodoxy because they believed that the Ulema, the Muslim 
Priesthood, misinterpreted the Quran. They felt that the Ulema 
were combining religion and political policy, cooperating with 
the sultanate and deviating fkom the original democratic and 
egalitarian principles of the Quran. Because the Sufis 
remained isolated from the society they opposed, their impact 
has been less direct and enduring today than it  otherwise 
might have been. The leaders of the Bhakti movement, called 
Santas (or saints), traced their lineage to the devotional cults of 
India and shared common ground with the Sufis, but they did 
not believe in Sufi mysticism. Nor were the Bhakti saints aloof 
or isolated from the people; they wanted to make their teaching 
comprehensible to the less educated. They attacked caste, 
institutionalized religion that was rigidly controlled by a 
priesthood and the worship of icons, and encouraged women to 
join their gatherings where they were taught in the local 
vernacular. The Bhakti saints came from a variety of 
backgrounds. There were members of lower castes and outcasts 
such as Kabir, the weaver, and Ravidas, the leather worker, 
both of whose writings were incorporated into the Guru Granth 
Sahib. It has been suggested that: 
Although Islam predominated culturally in Moghul India, 
Hinduism remained vital and creative and some Muslims and 
Hindus co-operated in the arts and intellectual projects. The 
subcontinent had long been free of religious intolerance and 
during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the most 
creative forms of Hinduism stressed the unity of religious 
RELIGION (1991), for a well-balanced and scholarly analysis. 
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aspiration: all paths were valid provided that they stressed an 
interior love for the one God.63 
GUN Nanak himself came from a rural background. He was 
the son of a village accountant. Although Hindu, he was 
educated through the generosity of a Moslem friend and was 
later employed as a storekeeper in the Afghan administration. 
Subsequently, he joined the Sufis and left home even though he 
was married and had three children. Guru Nanak's most 
important contribution, however, came when he left the Sufis 
to travel and to teach. He undertook four journeys between 
1500 and 1522 ranging from between two to ten years. In these 
journeys he travelled across the width of India to Bengal, 
across its length to Sri Lanka, up north through Tibet to what 
later became the USSR, and finally westward to Mecca in 
Saudi Arabia. Eventually, he returned to his family and 
children to settle in India and preach to his disciples.64 
Historically, GUN Nanak and Kabir (1440-1518) are the most 
important saints of the Bhakti movement. Both provided the 
turning point for the movement, and both expressed the 
sentiments of the urban class and of the village artisans, 
groups that were forward-looking and better off. They neither 
attempted to reform institutionalized Hinduism by attacking 
its methods of worship, nor attempted to submerge 
consciousness in devotion. However, whereas Kabir either 
denied the Hindu and Muslim ideas of God or equated them in 
harmony, GUN Nanak went fbrther and described God without 
reference to either. Thus Guru Nanak said: "There is neither 
Hindu or Mussulman so whose path should I follow? I shall 
follow God's path. God is neither Hindu nor Mussulman and 
the path which I follow is God's." The standard and most basic 
prayer of the Sikhs, a prayer written by Guru Nanak, in fact, 
thus invokes God in all His unaffiliated greatness: 
The True One was in the beginning, the True One was in the 
primal age, 
The True One is now also, 0 Nandk, the True One shall also 
be, 
63. ARMSTRONG, supra note 46, at 302. On the Bhakti saints see, F.E. KEAY, 
KABIR AND HIS FOLLOWERS (1931); W.H. MCLEOD, KABIR, NANAK AND THE EARLY 
SIKH PANTH RELIGIOUS CHANGE AND CULTURAL DOMINATION (David N. Lorenzen 
ed., 1981); J.A. SUBHAN, SUFISM: ITS SAINTS AND SHRINES (1960). 
64. See K. VERMA, GURU NANAK AND THE GOSPEL OF DMNE LOTUS (1968). 
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By His order bodies are produced; His order cannot be 
described. 
By His order souls are infused into them; by his order 
greatness is obtained. 
By His order men are high or low; by His order they obtain 
pre-ordained pain or pleasure. 
By his order some obtain their reward; by His order others 
must ever wander in transmigration. 
All are subject to His order; none is exempt from it. 
He who understands God's order, 0 Nanak, is never guilty of 
egoism. 
Thapar states that both Kabir and Nanak developed a new 
concept of God for a new religious group: "This concept was 
derived from the two existing religious forces, but neither of 
them consciously tried to combine and reconcile them? 
Terence Thomas says of the Moslem and Hindu influence on 
Sikhism that "Sikhs themselveq however, deny the charge of 
syncretism and with some ju~tification?~ McLeod is more 
forthright when he states: 
[A] common interpretation of the religion of Guru Nanak 
must be rejected. It is not correct to interpret it as a conscious 
effort to reconcile Hindu belief and Islam by means of a 
synthesis of the two. The intention to reconcile was there, but 
not by the path of syncretism. Conventional Hindu belief and 
Islam were not regarded as fbndamentally right but as 
hdamentally wrong. Neither the Veda nor the Kateb know 
the mystery. 
The two are rejected, not harmonized in a synthesis of 
their finer  element^.^' 
In sum, Sikhism (like any emerging religion) evolved 
against the background of existing religious faiths, namely, the 
rich traditions of Islam and Hinduism, but it is not a 
continuation of those religious beliefs.68 In fact, with its own 
particular history, tradition, geographical identity, doctrinal 
religious belief, and sacred text, Sikhism is more different from 
65. R. THAPAR, A HISTORY OF INDIA 311 (1966). 
66. Thomas, supra note 37, at 210. 
67. W.H. MCLEOD, NANAK AND THE SIKH RJ~LIGION 161 (1968). 
68. There is an unfortunate tendency to view it as such. See supra note 62. 
For example, Miss Armstrong states that "some Muslims and Hindus formed 
interfaith societies, the most important of which became Sikhism, founded by Guru 
Nanak in the fifteenth century." See ARMSTONG, supra note 46, at 302. 
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Islam and Hinduism than Protestantism is from Catholicism. 
The differences are more akin to the differences between 
Judaism and Christianity, which, like Sikhism, Hinduism and 
Islam, also share a common heritage. The fact that the 
differences between Sikhism and Hinduism and Islam are 
sometimes obscured is principally due to the focus on Sikhs' 
physical and marital characteristics, rather than on the 
philosophical tenets of their faith, a faith which is amongst the 
most fulfilling and liberating for the individual today. 
Although a Temple existed in London as early as 1913, 
Britain did not receive its first large group of citizen Sikhs 
until the 1950s after India received its independence in 1947 
and the post-World War I1 "reconstruction period" caused 
severe labor shortages. Later, the Sikh expulsion from Uganda 
by General Idi Amin in 1972 brought a fresh wave of Sikh 
immigrants. Sikhs had a special affection for the British 
Crown. The British also held the Sikhs in high regard. They 
thought well of their last ruler, Maharajah Ranjit Singh who 
sat on the throne of Lahore from 1797 until his death in 
1839.~' The Maharajah had extended his kingdom beyond the 
Punjab and annexed Kashmir and the North West Frontier, 
including the treacherous Khyber Pass. In 1846, T.H. Thornton 
wrote in his History of the Punjab that "Ranjit Singh has been 
likened to Mehemet Ali and Napoleon. . . . There are some 
points in which he resembles both; but estimating his character 
with reference to his circumstances and position, he is perhaps 
a more remarkable man than either."" In 1898 Alex Gardner 
had written in his memoirs that 
The Maharajah was indeed one of those master-minds which 
only require opportunity to change the face of the globe. 
Ranjit Singh made a great and powerfid nation from the 
disunited confederacies of the Sikhs and would have carried 
his conquests to Delhi or even further, had it not been for the 
simultaneous rise and consolidation of the British Empire in 
India." 
69. See H.T. PRINSEP, ORIGIN OF THE SIKH POWER IN THE PUNJAB AND 
POLITICAL LIFE OF MAHARAJAH &WJIT SINGH WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE RELIGION, 
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE SIKHS (1970). 
70. T.H. THORNTON, HISTORY OF THE PUNJAB (1846). 
71. SACHA, supra note 53, at 26; see SIR G.C. NARANG, THE TRANSFORMATION 
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It was indeed the rise of the British Empire that was the 
most important turning point in Sikh history.72 Within four 
years of his death, by 1843, all the male members of the Royal 
Family had been killed, with the exception of Ranjit Singh's 
youngest son, Prince Duleep Singh. He was crowned at the age 
of six with his mother, Maharani Jind Kaur, acting as his 
regent. The Anglo-Sikh wars took place in 1845-1846 and 1848- 
1849. After the defeat of the Sikh armies in 1849 the Punjab 
was annexed by the British. Prince Duleep Singh was removed 
from his kingdom in 1850. He was converted to Christianity on 
March 8th, 1853, and taken to England in 1854.'~ There he 
was made a ward of Queen Victoria who had a special affection 
for him. Terence Thomas writes that %om being a valiant 
enemy the Sikhs became fiercely loyal to the British Crown."74 
They maintained this loyalty at the time of the First War of 
Indian Independence in 1857 (popularly described as the 
Indian Mutiny). They formed the major part of the British 
Indian Army fighting courageously in the First and Second 
World Wars. Prince Duleep Singh was never able to return to 
India. Although in adulthood he reconverted back to Sikhism 
and tried to seek assistance from Russia to reclaim his 
heritage, he died of a broken heart in Paris on October 22, 
1893. He had a majestic residence at Elvedon Hall, in rural 
Thetford in Suffolk, of which he was squire. Sikhs in England 
undertake an annual pilgrimage to Elvedon Hall. They are 
lobbying the British government to have it recognized as a Sikh 
historic site. For them, the Sikh connection with Britain has 
royal roots in the special personal relationship between Queen 
Victoria and Prince Duleep Singh, and this connection pre- 
dates the modem period of migration which took place a 
hundred years afterwards. 
The Sikhs prospered under the British after the loss of 
their territories. When the Chenab Canal was opened in 1892, 
the British offered the Sikhs much land in the Punjab to 
convert from desert into green pasture through irrigation. 
Khushwant Singh, the leading Sikh historian, writes that 
OF SIKHISM (1969); H. WE, SOLDIER AND TFbIVELLER: MEMOIRS OF ALEXANDER 
GARDNER (1970); H. STEINBACH, THE PUNJAB (1845); THORNTON, supra note 70. The 
sentiments above are echoed in these works. 
72. See G.k HENTY, THROUGH THE SIKH WAR (1970). 
73. R.R. CHAKRABARTY, DDULEEP SINGH: THE MAHARAJAH OF PUNJAB & THE 
RAJ (1988) (currently out of print). 
74. Thomas, supra note 37, at 214. 
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"[tlhe Punjabis became the most prosperous peasantry of India; 
and of the Punjabis, the Sikhs became the most prosperous of 
all."75 The Sikhs became relatively well educated and literate 
in English. Aurora considers the Sikhs the fourth most 
westernized group in India after the Parsis, Jews and 
Chr i~ t ians .~~  Terence Thomas writes that "Sikhs display an 
astonishingly high level of English literacy for a rural 
The Sikhs' education and westernization made 
it easier for them to migrate to Britain. Yet, with the 
significant influx of Sikhs into Britain the question now 
becomes, how well has Britain accommodated the Sikhs as a 
religious group and protected their religious liberties? 
This question is important for a religious minority such as 
the Sikhs because no matter how westernized they may be and 
willing to adapt in the host country, they ultimately have to 
rely on adequate statutory and constitutional protections if 
they are to have a measure of security in the practice of their 
faith which makes them what they are. When faced with an 
influx of new immigrants after the Second World War, in the 
1950s,'~ such as Baptists from the West Indies, Sikhs and 
Hindus from India, and Muslims from Pakistan and 
Bangladesh, Britain did not pass a religious freedom statute.7g 
We will later see that it viewed this new influx as a racial 
issue and passed a series of Race Discrimination Acts in the 
hope that this would secure for them an equality of treatment 
at every level.80 Britain, therefore, does not have a religious 
freedom statute. To determine whether religious freedoms are 
generally protected in other ways, however, we have to turn to 
Britain's constitutional arrangements and particularly at how 
Britain's Constitution has treated religious liberties. 
75. SINGH, supra note 37, at 116-119. 
76. G.S. AURORA, THE NEW FRONTIERSMEN: A SOCIOLOGICAL S m y  OF INDIAN 
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 30-31 (1967). 
77. Thomas, supra note 37, at 215. 
78. For an account, see SATVINDER JUSS, IMMIGRATION, NATIONALITY AND 
CIT~NSHIP 39-42 (1993) (Foreword by the Honorable Justice Stephen Sedley). 
79. This is because race was the overwhelming factor in the public 
perception. One of the earliest accounts is E.J.B. ROSE, COLOUR AND CITIZENSHIP 
(1969). 
80. See infia part 1V.B. 
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The United Kingdom does not have the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment over which to debate, because unlike 
America, the United Kingdom does not have a written 
constitution that enshrines basic rights. Britain is generally 
perceived as having an historic constitution that has evolved 
through its particular history, especially since the English Civil 
War in the seventeenth century that led to its present-day 
system of government. This historical development has both a 
political and a highly religious dimension, although the 
religious dimension is often overlooked and hardly ever 
mentioned to students of constitutional law. 
Perhaps the religious dimension is not mentioned because 
the population in general does not regard religion as being of 
any great personal significance in Britain today, although 
politically it remains important because Parliament has, since 
the seventeenth century, secured, through a series of statutory 
enactments, state preference for the Protestant faith in the 
form of the Established Church of England, over all other 
religions (particularly the Catholic religion). This state 
preference is part of Britain's constitutional tradition but its 
continuance today acts to the detriment of religions such as the 
Sikhs' that are newly amved on the scene. While Parliament 
promotes and consecrates one particular religious faith, there is 
not a single constitutional document that underpins such basic 
rights. It is, therefore, highly debatable whether there is a 
constitution at all. 
The question is particularly important because given the 
absence of statutory protections for other religious faiths in 
Britain, it is necessary to consider whether an answer is or can 
be found in Britain's constitutional arrangements, particularly 
since common law conceptions of fairness and justice have 
made an impact not only in America but in former British 
colonial territories from where the new immigrants came.81 
These very people may, therefore, justifiably look to Britain's 
constitutional principles for the protection of their religious 
rights when they are in Britain. 
The thesis that I am advancing here, however, is that an 
examination of this constitutional arrangement leads us 
81. See M.C. SETALRAD, THE COMMON LAW IN INDIA (1969) (Hamlyn Lectures 
by the Attorney General of India). 
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precisely to the realization and conclusion that the way forward 
in Britain was, most naturally, not in a new constitutional 
settlement, but in the passing of a new Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act such as the one passed most recently in the 
United States, where after all, there was already an existing 
First Amendment Religious Clause in the Constitution which 
alone was not effective enough to secure religious freedom for 
all. In Britain, by contrast, there is not even an established 
constitution because religious and political struggles 
contributed in the seventeenth century to prevent the 
formation of a written constitution in Britain. 
To demonstrate these points, we need to first look a t  the 
nature of Britain's Constitution, where there is no protection of 
religious liberties. Next, we will look at a series of highly 
significant religious enactments that have shaped the character 
of the state of Britain, but where the protection is solely for one 
particular faith to the detriment of another, particularly the 
Catholic faith. I will conclude that Sikh religious rights can be 
most easily secured by the passing of one modern religious 
enactment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act which will 
secure religious freedoms for all. 
Traditionally, it is A.V. Dicey, Vinerian Professor of Law at  
Oxford University, who is thought to have defined the British 
Constitution since there is no single document to which one can 
refer for identifi~ation.'~ Yet, a t  the very time that he was 
giving the preeminent exposition of the British Constitution, 
which has been handed down ever since his Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution, written in 1~85,8~ the 
very existence of a British Constitution was being questioned 
by James Bryce. Bryce wrote that the distinguishing feature of 
a constitution is that "[ilt is enacted not by the ordinary 
legislative authority but by some higher and specially 
82. Thus, Vernon Bogdanor, a leading constitutional expert in Britain, has 
remarked that "Dicey is Britain's substitute for a codified constitution" and has 
asked "[Ils there any other academic discipline still dominated by the work of an 
author who wrote a hundred years ago?" See V. Bogdanor, Constitutional Law and 
Politics, 7 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 3 (1987). 
83. Dicey said that the British system of government was characterized by 
the Rule of Law, which he defined as "the absolute supremacy or predominance of 
regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, or even of wide 
discretionary authority on the part of government. Englishmen are ruled by the 
law, and by the law alone; a man may with us be punished for nothing else." AV. 
DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188, 
202 (10th ed. 1965). 
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empowered body. When any of its provisions conflict with a 
provision of the ordinary law, it prevails and the ordinary law 
must give way? Bollingbroke said in 1773 that "b]y 
Constitution we mean . . . that assemblage of laws, institutions 
and customs derived fiom certain fixed principles of reasoning 
. . . that compose the general system according to which the 
community has agreed to be g~verned."~' Yet, Dicey's 
perspective prevails today. In fact, it is said "that Dicey's word 
has in some respects become the only written constitution that 
[Britain has]. 
Dicey identified two principles underlying British 
constitutional law: parliament supremacy and rule of law.87 
Parliament supremacy means that Parliament can enact any 
law, and the courts, in recognition of Parliament's legislative 
monopoly, will be duty-bound to apply it. Similarly, 
Parliament's authority exceeds that of the executive. The 
House of Commons controls the executive branch and thereby 
prevents the executive from acting in harsh and oppressive 
ways. It is immediately apparent from the parliamentary 
supremacy doctrine why Britain does not have a constitutional 
court like the United States Supreme Court. Under this 
doctrine, not only is there to be no written constitution but 
there is to be no judicial guardianship of the constitution. 
Consequently, Britain does not have judicial review of 
legislative action, which is a major component of American 
constitutional law. Parliament is supreme and what it enacts, 
the courts must apply? 
84. F.F. Ridley, There Is No British Constitution: A Dangerous Case Of The 
Emperor's Clothes, 41 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 340, 343 (1988) (quoting James Bryce). 
85. Bolingbroke, A Dissertation upon Parties, in 2 R.IE WORKS OF LORD 
BOLINGBROKE 88 (1841). 
86. JOWELL & OLIVER, supm note 4, at v. 
87. DICEY, supm note 83, Chapter 13. 
88. Dicey said: 
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less 
than this, namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English 
Constitution, the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, 
further that no person or body is recognized by the law of England as 
having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament. 
Id. at 39-40. This principle was applied by the House of Lords in Pickin v. British 
Railways Board, 1974 App. Cas. 765, and by the Privy Council of the House of 
Lords in Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan, 1932 App. Cas. 526. 
See earlier discussions, supm notes 26-27 and 30. 
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Although British courts cannot question legislation, they 
can still question the departments' and public officials' 
discretionary mode of implementing the legislation. Here is 
where Dicey's second principle, rule of law, comes into play. 
Dicey disliked special rules and distinctive regimes. He 
believed everyone should be subject to the ordinary law of the 
realm as propounded by Parliament. Thus, he regarded every 
act and every institution of the state as subject to the ever- 
abiding principle of the "rule of law," interpreted as the 
prevalence of regular law over arbitrary and discretionary 
power. The content of the "rule of law" remains a decidedly 
limited one because only Parliament can review legislation, yet 
the principle has resulted in judicial review of administrative 
action, as courts evaluate how public officials have exercised 
their discretion under parliamentary enactments. In this 
judicial review of administrative acts, some of the most exciting 
developments in the protection of basic rights have occurred.89 
Ridley wrote in 1988, however, that judicial review of 
administrative acts still did not give Britain a constitution, as 
commonly understood, either written or unwritten. He based 
his views on those of James Bryce. Ridley stated that "Britain 
does not really have a constitution at all, merely a system of 
government, even if some parts of it are more important to our 
democratic order than others . . . He borrowed from James 
Bryce to say that "there is no test to discriminate between 
constitutional and less than constitutional elements since 
labelling has no defined consequence, unlike countries where 
constitutions are a higher form of law."" 
Ridley argued, based on James Bryce's views, that for a 
constitution to be properly so-called "in the international sense 
of the word," i t  must first establish a system of government so 
that the system of government depends on the constitution and 
is not independent from the Constitution. Second, it must set 
sovereign authority outside the order it establishes, perhaps by 
reference to "the people," as in America, thereby providing 
legitimacy for law and the governmental system. Third, i t  must 
operate as a form of law superior to other laws, thereby 
89. See R. Gordon Q.C., The Awakened Conscience of the Nation, COUNSEL, 
MarJApr. 1994, at 8 (arguing that the House of Lords has recently been acting 
like a constitutional court). 
90. RIDLEY, supra note 84, at 342. 
91. Id. at 359. 
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enabling judicial review of legislation by the courts. Lastly, i t  
must be entrenched so that its status as an authority is safe 
from political i n t e ~ e n t i o n . ~ ~  
These characteristics are, of course, arguably missing from 
the British Constitution. There is much talk in the common 
law of fundamental rights and fundamental but where 
in the Constitution does it say what is fundamental and where 
is the higher status ascribed to such alleged norms? Where, 
indeed, is the Constitution if it is not simply a state of mind 
emanating from the common law folklore of the constitutional 
struggles of the seventeenth century?94 Where in the British 
Constitution is there a legal definition of government? What 
exists is  a framework of ~ o n v e n t i o n s . ~ ~  However, a 
conventional framework is far too loose and conventions are too 
easily swept aside by a simple refusal to abide by them.96 If 
this is a system of government according to law, how can the 
government be made to comply with fundamental law? In 
short, does the British system comport with the notion of 
constitutionalism-limited government wherein power is 
located in and checked by an organizational framework of 
legislative, executive, and judicial functions, properly 
apportioned by the Constitution itself, as is widely understood 
from the written constitutions of the world's leading, modern 
democracies-or is the British system quite simply one of 
governmentalism where the state is, for all intents and 
purposes, equated with the towering power of the government? 
If Britain evinces the specter of the unconstitutional state, 
why has modem Britain failed to adopt a written constitution? 
This question is important from a religious rights point of view, 
where there is a common misconception that since the state 
92. Id. at 342-43. 
93. Especially, see J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL AW IN ENGLISH HISTORY 
(1955). 
94. Satvinder Juss, Silent Rights, NEW L. J., August 4, 1989, at 1069; see 
also Satvinder Juss, Reason, Natural Justice and the Common Law, 14 LITIGATION 
145-149 (NO. 4, 1995). 
95. G. ~~AFSHALL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE RULES AND FORMS OF 
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (1984). 
96. Thus it is now clear that the convention of Ministerial Responsibility is 
not being observed. See DIANA WOODHOUSE, MINISTERS AND PARLIAMENT: 
ACCOUNTABILITY N THEORY AND PRACTICE Chapters 3-6 (1994); Diana Woodhouse, 
Ministerial Responsibility in the 1990s: When Do Ministers Reign?, 46 
P A I U ~ ~ T A R Y  AFT. 277 (1993). 
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has nothing to say about religion in a constitution that does not 
exist, the state is neutral about such matters. 
There are two reasons why Britain does not have a written 
constitution. First, British history has been characterized by 
stability. There have not been many upheavals. Normally, 
countries adopt constitutions when they are about to make a 
fresh start. Unlike other European countries, Britain has not 
been invaded since the Norman Conquest of 1066 and has 
remained a sovereign state since then. England has, in 
consequence, not had to adopt a formal written constitution 
upon gaining independence, unlike most states of the common 
world. Its life has been characterized by a general inertia, by 
insularity, and by pragmatism in its approach to the handling 
of religious and political  question^.^' 
Second, while there was an opportunity for Britain to 
formulate and establish a written constitution in the 
seventeenth century at a time of great national strife and 
instability, this opportunity did not materialize, as we shall 
later see.98 Yet, this period is critical to our understanding of 
the quality of religious freedoms in Britain today because 
religion was a central contention during the constitutional 
struggles between Parliament and the Crown at this time, in 
what became a defining moment for the British state. 
The struggle was resolved in Parliament's favor, and 
subsequently not only did Britain have a constitutional 
monarchy, but that monarchy was required to protect and 
safeguard the Protestant faith as the state religion. The result 
is that Britain's official faith is its essential identifying 
hallmark. Clearly, therefore, the fact that there is no religious 
preference stated or secured in a written constitution does not 
mean, in this case, that the state is neutral about its religious 
orientation. 
Inevitably then, state policies are directed towards that 
orientation." Other religions, like the Sikh religion, will never 
fare as well in this climate of officially sanctioned forms of 
state preference and discrimination of religious faiths.'" 
97. The classic work to note here is SIR KENNETH WHEARE, MODERN 
C o ~ s m o ~ s  (2d ed. 1966). 
98. See infra part 1II.B. 
99. A recent example of this has been the making of Christianity a 
compulsory part of the state school system. See supm note 15. 
100. See infra part 1II.C. discussing disabilities .for other religious 
denominations. 
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What has to be recognized in any religious freedoms debate in 
Britain is that without the preservation of its faith as its 
central attribute, England is not England. The English state 
has been defined by its religion. 
A more complete case for passing a Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act that would assist the Sikhs in Britain to attain 
fuller expression of their faith can be made by looking at the 
historical development of English identity with faith and the 
Constitution that evolved from it. This is an especially useful 
exercise because we find that whereas England was unique in 
defining important questions of the state early (thus defining 
itself, for the state, long before written constitutions became 
fashionable elsewhere), in the process it "restored" to itself 
religious freedoms that i t  felt it was losing through 
encroachment from the outside. Britain clearly needs to restore 
these freedoms again in the context of its present multi- 
cultural society. 
I will therefore evaluate, by running through the salient 
features of the seventeenth century struggles, the historical 
development of English identity through faith and the 
constitution that evolved from it. I do so especially because 
constitutional history is much neglected in British law schools 
today and thus, this analysis may be useful to British readers 
as well as others. In the seventeenth century struggle, the 
Stuart kings staked their claim to rule autocratically as the 
appointees of God-a situation carrying fundamental religious 
implications in itself, but especially if that God turned out to be 
someone else's God. Oliver Cromwell squashed this claim by 
defeating the Royalists in battle, but began ruling 
autocratically himself when he was appointed Lord Protector. 
Disillusioned, Parliament summoned the King back again, and 
"restored" his position as monarch of the realm. Then, through 
a series of enactments-the Convention Parliament Act, the 
Coronation Oath Act, the Bill of Rights, and the Crown and 
Parliament Recognition Act which were passed in 1688 to 
1689-Parliament constitutionalized the position of the 
monarch as the protector of the state religion. This process was 
consecrated fully in the Act of Settlement of 1700 and extended 
to Scotland in the Union of Scotland Act of 1706. Through this 
process, which has never been reversed, Parliament 
disadvantaged other religious faiths. The passage of a Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act would reinstate equality of treatment 
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for other faiths such as the Sikhs. But the process must first be 
explained. 
The seventeenth century s t~gg les '~ '  are the most 
important period of political and religious upheaval in British 
history. As a result of these struggles, kings and queens lost 
their crowns, and some even their heads. We see the 
unmistakable link between politics and religion early in this 
struggle with the overbearing Charles I and the concomitant 
rise of the puritans.lo2 For both, politics and religion were 
indistinguishable. In describing this struggle, I look first at the 
English Civil War and then at  the Glorious Revolution, and 
then make out a case for Disestablishment that would pave the 
way for a Religious Freedom Restoration Act and would serve 
to protect the rights of all religions. 
A. The English Civil War (1 642-1 648)lo3 
Charles I, who assumed the English throne in 1625, like 
his father James I, who ruled between 1605 and 1625, believed 
the "divine right of Kings" to mean that he was only answer- 
able to God, not to Parliament.lo4 Three times between 1625 
and 1628, Charles tried to raise money by taxation without the 
consent of Parliament; each time Parliament objected and each 
time Charles dissolved the assembly. Charles then summoned 
Parliament in 1640 after he realized that even the illegal taxes 
he was collecting were insufficient. Opposition to Charles had 
become implacable, however. An important element in this 
opposition were the Puritans, so-called because they wanted to 
purify the Church of England. They wanted a simpler prayer 
book. They also wanted to do away with bishops. They believed 
in the power of individual faith, and they did not believe in the 
divine right of kings. They particularly opposed Charles I be- 
101. M. JUDSON, THE CRISIS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1949). 
102. Dominic Grant writes that %]he constitutional crisis of the seventeenth 
century was religious as well as political." However, most law students are not told 
this. See Dominic Grant, By Law Established: The Church of England and its 
Place in the Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL S'TUDIES 168, 175 (R. Blackburn ed., 
1992). 
103. For background reading, see C.V. WEDGWOOD, THE KING'S PEACE, 1637- 
1641 (1955); B.H.G. WORMALD, CLARENDON: POLITICS, HISTORY, RELIGION (1951). 
For the Civil War period, see C.V. WEDGW~D,  THE KING'S WAR, 1641-1647 (1958). 
However, the best indepth analysis of this period remains the ten volume work 
S.R. GARDNER, HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1603-1642 (1883-4). See also its four volume 
sequel, S.R. GARDNER, THE HISTORY OF THE GREAT CIVIL WAR, 1642-1649 (1893). 
104. A highly readable account is found in J.P. KENYON, RIE STUARTS (1958). 
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cause his wife Henrietta Maria was Catholic and they strongly 
suspected the king of favoring Catholicism. Law, religion, and 
politics were plainly and inextricably intertwined in this strug- 
gle, and any solution had to be a resolution of, not one, but all 
three of these issues. 
Led by Cromwell the Puritan,lo5 Parliament went to war 
in 1642, with its famous battles of Edgehill (1642), Marston 
Moor (1644) and Naseby (1645), and culminating in Charles I's 
defeat in 1648 and his trial for tyranny before a court at West- 
minster. On January 30, 1649, Charles I was executed. 
Subsequently, Cromwell set out to establish a republic. 
This may in time have provided an answer to the problems of 
religious toleration and constitutional government. Cromwell's 
rule was not popular however, because like the king, he ruled 
autocratically, not in the name of democracy, but in the name 
of God. During Cromwell's reign, Charles 1's son was crowned 
as Charles I1 in Scotland.'06 In 1660, two years after 
Cromwell's death, Parliament invited Charles I1 to take the 
throne. The old order was reinstated. Charles I1 did not control 
taxation like his father, but he still appointed all the ministers 
and he still controlled the army. Little had changed. 
An opportunity to adopt a written constitution evaporated 
as Cromwell's Instrument of Government of 1653 was discarded 
as the revolution fizzled out. This prevented the development of 
a system of proper constitutional government in Britain. The 
Instrument of Government was a genuine written constitution 
intended by Cromwell to be the basis of his republican form of 
government. No British schoolboy troubles himself to learn of it 
now. But, it was later to become very influential in the North 
American Colonies' struggle for independence fkom the Crown 
as they set themselves on the road to becoming the most consti- 
tutional state on earth. 
B. The Glorious Revolution (1688)lo7 
From the perspective of English constitutionalism and 
religious liberty, the first bloody revolution was much less 
significant than the second more peaceful revolution of the 
105. The best examination of Puritanism as a religious and intellectual move- 
ment is E.W. HldLER, THE RISE OF PURITANISM (1938). 
106. See D. OGG, ENGLAND IN THE REIGN OF CHARLES I1 (2d ed. 1955). 
107. See D. OGG, ENGLAND IN THE REIGNS OF JAMES 11 AND WILLIAM 111 
(1955). 
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seventeenth century. This was the Glorious Revolution of 1688, 
the revolution that defined Englishness, English nationalism 
and the character of the English state. This event precluded 
the recognition of religious diversity in Britain. Charles I1 was 
succeeded by his son James I1 in 1685,'" but James ruled on- 
ly three years before being deposed in 1688 because he favored 
Roman Catholics. Fearful of James' Catholic bias, Parliament 
invited the Protestant ruler of the Netherlands, William of 
Orange, who had married Mary in 1677, the Protestant daugh- 
ter of James 11, to invade England. He landed at Torbay with 
an army drawn from the low countries and from Protestant 
Europe on November 5, 1688. The Protestant link is obvious. In 
December 1688 James I1 fled to France, William and Mary 
gave terms on which they were accepted as King and Queen by 
Parliament and these terms are laid out in a series of stat- 
utes.log It  is important to note here that these statutes are 
the leading statutes of English constitutional law, and that if 
there was a specific right to religious freedom in the British 
Constitution for such groups as the Sikhs, the discriminatory 
and offending parts of these statutory provisions would today 
be subject to repeal. These aspects of the statutes may now be 
considered. 
1. Convention Parliament Act (1688) 1 William & Mary 
Chapter I 
For Parliament, the most important matter was that there 
should never again be any question mark raised about its right 
to assemble and sit as Parliament. The first thing William and 
Mary had to agree to was to "An Act for Removing and Pre- 
venting all Questions and 'Disputes' Concerning the Assem- 
bling and Sitting of this Parlyament." Passed on January 22, 
1688, the Act declared that there be two Houses of Parliament. 
No religious issue was involved, and thus, there is no discrimi- 
natory or offending position here. However, even though not 
controversial, this statute is hardly known to law students in 
England. 
108. The best biography on James I1 is F.C. TUXNER, JAMES I1 (1949). 
109. The series of statutes are laid out in the subsequent discussion. Despite 
its Whig bias, a good account of this period is MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 
(Sir Charles Firth ed., 1913-15). 
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2. The Coronation Oath Act (1688) 2 William & Mary Chap- 
ter 6 
A second statutory enactment by Parliament focused on 
the King and Queen and how they were to conduct themselves 
in preserving the realm. The Coronation Act was "An Act for 
Establishing the Coronation Oath" whereby the King was re- 
quired on assuming the throne to "solemnley promise and 
sweare to governe the people of this Kingdome . . . according to 
the statutes in Parlyament agreed on and the laws and customs 
of the same" and required to "maintaine the laws of God the 
true profession of the Gospel1 and the Protestant reformed reli- 
gion established by law" and required to "preserve unto the 
bishops and clergy of this realme and to the churches commit- 
ted to their charge all such rights and privileges." Under this 
statute Parliament has made the Crown the protector of one 
faith only, which faith the Crown must maintain with strict 
accordance to its true principles and whose churches and spiri- 
tual leaders the Crown must also preserve. This is discrimina- 
tory because it lends state sanction to one faith only. Sikh 
leaders cannot turn to the Crown, or for that matter to Parlia- 
ment, to ask for similar protections under this statute. 
3. The Bill of Rights (1689) 1 William & Mary Session 2 
Chapter 2 
The most important statute of this period is however, the 
Bill of Rights. In the Bill of Rights of 1689 (which is unlike the 
bill of rights of any other country and which, again, no school- 
boy troubles himself unduly over), Parliament for the first time 
forbade the succession of Roman Catholics to the throne and 
the monarch's marriage to a Roman Catholic. There is an un- 
doubted hostility here to another religious faith which under a 
modem system of government would be considered unnecessary 
and unconstitutional. The Bill charged that "James the second 
. . . did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the Protestant reli- 
gion and the lawes and liberties of this Kingdome." He did so, 
inter alia, "[bly causing several good subjects being Protestants 
to be disarmed at the same time when papists were both armed 
and imployed contrary to the law." 
This Act is worth quoting extensively because of its impla- 
cable hostility to the Catholic Church. It is significant more 
today because it detracts from a principle of religious diversity 
and tolerance which we expect to be the hallmark of contempo- 
SIKHS IN BRITAIN 
rary liberal democracies, and which ironically, is a principle 
that many people generally believe can be easily obsemed in 
Britain today. Given that this is so, a statute such as this is 
harmful to the aspirations of a multi-cultural society and harm- 
ful to the interests of a mature democracy and should be 
amended. Parliament need only pass a Religious Freedom Res- 
toration Act to do this.'1° 
The Bill dictated that "the two Houses of Parlyament 
should continue to sitt and with their Majesties royal1 concur- 
rence make effectual1 provision for the settlement of the reli- 
gion lawes and liberties of this Kingdome soe that the same for 
the future might not be in danger againe of being subvert- 
ed . . . .""' To this end, it concluded that 
whereas it hath beene found by experience that it is inconsis- 
tent with the safety and welfaire of this protestant Kingdome 
to be governed by a popish prince or by any King or Queene 
marrying a papist the said lords spiritual1 and temporal1 and 
commons doe further pray that it may be enacted that all and 
every person and persons that is or are shall be reconciled to 
or shall hold communion with the see or church of Rome or 
shall professe the popish religion or shall marry a papist shall 
be excluded and be forever uncapable to inherit possesse or 
enjoy the crowne and government of this realme . . . .'I2
Not trusting the King any longer to not "subvert and extirpate 
the Protestant religion and the lawes and liberties of this 
Kingdome," Parliament also made it  illegal for a monarch to 
suspend laws, to keep an army in peacetime or to impose taxes 
of his own v~lition."~ The effect of this law was far-reaching 
in that Parliament and the legislative process was manifestly 
committed henceforward to the protection of religious freedom, 
but because this form of protection had evolved in a way that 
was reactive rather than proactive, Parliament had only given 
protection to the Protestant faith (against the Catholic faith) 
and not to all other faiths as well. In its determination to up- 
hold the right to its faith, Parliament utilized the office of the 
crown in the circumstances. 
110. See supra pp. 6-8. 
111. 1 W. & M. sess 2 ch. 2 9 1 (1688). 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
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4. Crown and Parliament Recognition Act (1 689) 2 William 
& Mary Chapter 1 
To place this palpable transfer of power from monarchy to 
Parliament beyond question, the Crown and Parliament Recog- 
nition Act was passed in 1689, which was "An Act for 
Recognising King William and Queene Mary and for avoiding 
all Questions touching the Acts made in the Parliament at West- 
minster the thirteenth day of February one thousand six hun- 
dred and eighty eight."ll4 This Act emphasized that "all and 
singular the acts made and enacted in the said Parlyament 
were and are statutes of this Kingdome and as such ought to be 
reputed taken and obeyed by all the people of this 
Kingd~me.""~ Not even British law students must learn 
about the significance of this Act. Yet, thus was the constitu- 
tional doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty solidified in Brit- 
ain and by this doctrine Parliament alone obtained the au- 
thority to legislate on religious liberty matters. Remarkably, 
notwithstanding Britain's earlier experience in legislating on 
these issues during this period, this is an authority that it has 
in modern times scarcely exercised on religious liberty issues. 
So traumatic it seems has been the experience of the seven- 
teenth century upheavals that legislative initiative in the mat- 
ter of religious freedoms is not easily countenanced by the 
British Parliament, particularly where such an initiative has 
the effect of enfranchising the religious rights of new religious 
groups such as the Sikhs. Instead, protection for such groups 
takes the form of other non-discriminatory statutory enact- 
ments, which are manifestly unsuited, as we shall see. 
The Bill of Rights of 1688 contains the first sanction of 
hostility to the Catholic Church in Britain's constitutional ar- 
rangements, although Catholics were banned from sitting in 
either House of Parliament in 1678. The Bill of Rights also 
inaugurated the establishment of a religion of the state, by the 
state, for the state, in the form of the Protestant faith. As such, 
the Bill of Rights augured badly for the quality of religious 
freedom in Britain today. That deficient quality continues to 
this day and affects the religious rights of Sikhs and other new 
groups in Britain. Within, the Bill of Rights's establishment 
provisions were the inevitable product of England's constitu- 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
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tional struggles. Without, Protestant establishment was en- 
couraged by England's sustained opposition to Catholic Spain, 
France and Ireland, which opposition was at its height at the 
time the Bill of Rights was enacted. 
5. The Act of Settlement (1700) 12 & 13 William 3 Chapter 2 
The process of Protestant establishment continued in the 
next incumbent of the throne when twelve years later Princess 
Sophia, Electress and Duchess dowager of Hanover, succeeded 
to the monarchy. The Act of Settlement 1700 was passed as 
"An Act for the Limitation of the crown and better securing the 
rights and liberties of the subje~t.""~ The Act acknowledged 
her succession "in the protestant line to the imperiall 
crown"117 and emphasized "that every King and Queen of this 
realm who shall come to and succeed in the imperiall crown of 
this Kingdom by virtue of this Act shall have the coronation 
oath administered to  him or her at their respective corona- 
tions . . . ."'" The supreme importance of the Coronation 
Oath cannot be overemphasized, for it established a symbiotic 
link between the monarch and the established church which 
the monarch and all those in line to the throne were duty- 
bound to uphold. Thus, as the crown became a constitutional 
monarchy, the protection of the established church became a 
raison-d'Etre of that monarchy. 
6. Union with Scotland Acts (1 706) 6 Anne Chapter 11 
Consolidation of this process continued into the reign of the 
last Stuart monarch, Queen Anne, who reigned from 1702- 
1714, when the established church was extended to Scotland. 
The core of Britain's constitutional relationship between 
church, state and people was established in the Union of Scot- 
land Act of 1706 which was passed when England entered into 
a union with the independent State of Scotland. The two par- 
liaments were merged into a new Parliament of the United 
Kingdom when they both passed separate Union with Scotland 
Acts ratifying the Treaty of Union that had been negotiated 
between the two kingdoms to make it into one. One Act was 
passed in London, the other in Edinburgh, to unite Scotland 
116. 12 & 13 Will. 3 ch. 2 (1700). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
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with England. Curiously, though adopted in a system of gov- 
ernment where Parliament was always free to amend or abol- 
ish prior laws, the Act of Union with Scotland, passed in Lon- 
don, bears all the hallmarks of a fundamental law or constitu- 
tion, for it declares that "this Act of Parliament . . . shall be 
held and observed in all time coming as a fundamental and 
essential condition of any treaty or union to be concluded be- 
twixt the two kingdoms without any alteration thereof or dero- 
gation thereto in any sort f~rever.""~ It also states that "all 
laws and statutes in this Kingdom so far they are contrary to 
or inconsistent with the terms of these articles . . . shall from 
and after the union cease and become void."'20 The Act fur- 
ther provides "for establishing the Protestant religion and 
Presbyterian Church government within the Kingdom of Scot- 
land" and makes similar provisions for England. The Act pro- 
hibits "any alteration of the worship, discipline and government 
of the Church of this Kingdom as now by law established" and 
requires that "the worship discipline and government of this 
Church should be effectually and unalterably secured . . . ."I2' 
One modern writer has explained that the Union with Scotland 
Acts, designed to merge the two Parliaments, "provided a rudi- 
mentary framework of a written con~titution."'~~ 
Yet, whether the Acts established a framework in which 
Britain could develop a written constitution or not, the acts did 
nothing to promote the religious freedom that is required in the 
modern pluralist state; indeed, the acts entrenched the reli- 
gious establishment of Protestantism. They have been positive- 
ly harmful to the cause of religious fieedom because they are 
simply deemed to be fundamental to the existence of the Unit- 
ed Kingdom as constituent Acts and as such, taking priority 
over the other statutes. The perception of their fundamentality 
is not something that need detain legislators today, however, 
and I have at  the outset shown that the constitutional obstacles 
in disregarding these Acts are not insurmountable.'" What is 
necessary today is legislation that promotes the objectives of 
religious pluralism. 
119. Union with Scotland Acts, 6 Anne ch. 11 (1706). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. S. DE SMlTH & R. BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 
(7th ed. 1994). 
123. See supra pp. 6-8. 
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C. A Case for Disestablishment 
The foregoing analysis has attempted to provide a sketch of 
the salient features of Britain's religious history. This history 
has determined, and continues to determine to this day, 
Britain's response to the questions of religious liberty. There is 
a marked absence of legislative initiatives taken to help other 
religious groups, or even to recognize the existence of other 
religious groups. Thus, whereas it may be said that Britain has 
placed a high premium on the right of its inhabitants to ob- 
serve the Protestant faith without any fear whatsoever, it can- 
not be said that it has demonstrated the same commitment to 
the observance of other faiths by other peoples. Whatever may 
have been the exigencies of the moment in the seventeenth 
century, the situation in the modern era, has produced a pro- 
found imbalance in the Constitution. 
Originally, this imbalance became most readily visible with 
the Roman Catholics. It is true that the ban on Roman Catho- 
lics entering Parliament was lified in the nineteenth century, 
but this only happened after the conversion to Rome of John 
Henry Newman, a Protestant priest, who in 1833 launched the 
Ractarian (Anglo-Catholic) movement and made English Ca- 
tholicism respectable again. It is also true that Roman Catho- 
lics were henceforward allowed to vote at elections and were 
eligible for state offices. Yet only in 1974 was it made clear 
that an adherent of the Roman Catholic faith could stand for 
the Lord Chancellorship.'" This demonstrates that the ties 
between the church and the state continue to the present day. 
These ties affect the religious liberty of the individual in Brit- 
ain and they are not compatible with the concept of the individ- 
ual in the modern state.'25 
The requirement that the sovereign be a Protestant is not 
just a limit 'on the liberties of those who may succeed to the 
throne. This requirement also implies that the sovereign should 
be a Christian and represent an ideal. This offends not only 
religious minorities who are not Christian but also most Chris- 
tians who do not aspire to a Christian ideal. The non-Christian 
religious groups see in this imposed ideal not just a country 
124. Lord Chancellor (Tenure of Office and Discharge of Ecclesiastical Func- 
tions) Act 1974, 8 1 (1974). 
125. See Joan Bakewell, Search for the Secular Soul, THE GUARDIAN (London), 
November 26, 1993 at 24; Walter Schwarz, Church Has Failed in the Marketplace, 
THE GUARDIAN (London), December 13, 1993, at 4. 
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that is Christian in its attitudes, but Christian in its moral 
aspirations, which aspirations the non-Christians may not 
share. 
Yet their own faith, by which they strive to live in these 
difficult circumstances, does not have the sanction of the state 
as does the imposed value system of the Protestant Christian 
faith. The sovereign takes a special interest in that established 
faith, but he takes none in other faiths. Thus, the sovereign 
must approve by law the Church's choice of bishops, twenty-six 
of which may then automatically be members of the upper 
House of Parliament,126 the House of Lords, and no such 
right exists for senior members of other faiths. Unsurprisingly, 
advocates of constitutional reform argue that in a reformed 
Parliament, the major religions of the country may well be 
given a similar voice in the second chamber. 
The chilling effect of the established Church of England on 
those not of the established faith seeps vertically downward 
into the lower echelons of society in even more practical ways. 
Thus, every person in a parish (the traditional unit of civil 
government for such purposes as poor law administration; each 
parish has its own church and clergyman) and not just the 
signed members of the Church of England, has the right to ask 
for the services of the parish church. Furthermore, the state 
has the right to appoint financial officers to supervise the en- 
dowments of the Church of England. No such rights exist for 
other faiths. This was far more significant in the days before 
the Second World War. The system of poor law related to the 
public (compulsory) relief of the indigent poor. By the Poor 
Relief Act of 1601, overseers of the poor were appointed in 
every parish to provide for the relief of paupers settled there, 
and to levy a rate on property therein. Although the National 
Assistance Act of 1948 transferred to the state many responsi- 
bilities, even today, the state can appoint officers to manage 
the churches' resources in these circumstances. In the same 
way, the state funds the Church of England's state schools. 
Muslims and Sikhs have applied for their schools to be so sup- 
ported, but there is currently not a single such school. In 1920, 
the Anglican Church in Wales was disestablished because of 
the sheer strength of nonconformist churches in Wales which 
- -- - - - 
126. Grant, supra note 102, at 169. 
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led to the Welsh Church Act of 1914. In the next few years, 
similar pressures may force a change in England as well.la7 
Having, in the preceding two sections, described the Sikhs 
and their religious beliefs, as well as the distinctive character- 
istics of evolving British religious and constitutional history, we 
must now consider the device that Britain adopted to protect 
the religious rights of Sikhs who arrived in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. A new religious faith such as Sikhism was not 
going to be assimilated easily into Britain's complex historical 
arrangement. Sikhs suffered discrimination, but what was 
noteworthy about this discrimination in relation to that suf- 
fered by other minority groups newly amved in Britain was 
that it was preeminently religious. There was discrimination in 
jobs, and still is. 
Many Sikhs cannot not find employment in Britain unless 
they first remove their turbans and shave their hair. Brown 
writes that "more than one Sikh, when told that a job was 
taken, has returned home, shaved, and successfully re-applied 
for the same job."la8 In 1964, a London Transport guard was 
suspended fkom work for forty days because, after obtaining his 
job, he grew his hair again and wore his turban. Many also 
discarded their Kirpan for fear of offending British laws. In the 
late 1960s a famous dispute arose between male Sikh bus em- 
ployees and the Wolverhampton Council over the right of Sikhs 
to wear turbans rather than peaked caps. The Sikh busmen 
eventually won the dispute in April 1969 after a two-year bat- 
tle and were allowed to wear their turbans. In December 1969, 
the Race Relations Board (RRB), established under the 1965 
Act, found Wolverhampton Council to be guilty of racial dis- 
crimination. 
Yet, the discrimination had plainly been religious and not 
racial since unturbaned, clean-shaven Sikhs were readily able 
to gain employment with the council. The discrimination was 
127. This pressure became most evident in the wake of the Satanic Verses af- 
fair, when Muslims in Britain were unable to successfully bring blasphemy actions 
in the courts against Salman Rushdie. See R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary 
Magistrate ez parte Choudhury, 1 All E.R. 306, 318 (1991) (Watkins, L.J.). For an 
excellent account of this, see also A. Bradney, Taking Sides: Religion, Law and 
Politics, NEW L.J., March 26, 1993, at 434, 443. 
128. J. BROWN, THE UNMELTING POT 116 (1969). 
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treated as racial, because no other potentially applicable cate- 
gory existed in the law of racial discrimination, which was the 
device that Britain used to tackle the problems of all minorities 
living in Britain. No affirmation of the right to religious 
freedom exists in British law, save in respect to the established 
Church of England. Yet, to wrongly categorize discrimination 
as racial when it is in fact religious, can cause more harm than 
good. 
In this section, therefore, I will develop the theme of the 
insufficiency and unpredictability of British law in protecting 
religious freedoms, which makes the case for a detailed and 
specific religious freedom legislation compelling and unavoid- 
able. I will do this by noting first the inadequacy of the com- 
mon law; second, the inadequacy of each of the three Race 
Relations Acts passed by Parliament to curb religious discrimi- 
nation; third, the way in which Parliament consciously decided 
not to include a religious fkeedom category in the legislation; 
fourth, I will consider the leading case under this legislation to 
date, namely, the Mandla decision and the meaning of "ethnic 
origins" given to i t  by the House of Lords; and finally, I will 
bolster the case for a Religious Freedom Act by looking at  the 
threat posed by generally applicable laws. 
A. The Inadequacy of the Common Law 
British politicians saw immigration and race relations "as 
emotional, irrational and intractable matters, not amenable to 
the reason, negotiation and compromise which characterized 
economical and class issues."129 Consequently, they wished 
"to avoid or suppress"130 such issues instead of confront them. 
As politicians avoided immigration and race relations issues, 
the inadequacy of the common law as an instrument of social 
justice became apparent. The common law was the law of free- 
dom; it allowed the individual, subject to the restrictions of 
criminal law, to act as he or she would. Thus, under the com- 
mon law, an individual was .free to discriminate. As Lord Si- 
mon said in the House of Commons, "The Common law before 
the making of the first Race Relations Act (1965) was that 
people could discriminate against others on the ground of 
colour, etc . . . to their heart's content. This unbridled capacity 
129. Z. LAYTON-HENRY, THE POLITICS OF RACE IN BRITAIN xiv (1984). 
130. Id. 
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to discriminate was the mischief and defect for which Common 
law did not provide."131 Because the common law did not bar 
discrimination, it was left to Parliament to confront the dis- 
crimination problem. 
B. The Inadequacy of the Race Relations Legislation 
1. The Race Relations Act (1 965) 
In 1965, Parliament enacted the first Race Relations Act 
which outlawed discrimination in certain places of public re- 
sort, such as dance halls and public houses, and in the disposal 
of tenancies where there was much discrimination by landlords, 
and created the offence of incitement to racial hatred. It also 
established the Race Relations Board (RRB) to operate concilia- 
tion procedures in the form of conciliation committees, with 
resort to the Attorney General to bring the case to court as a 
final 0pti0n.l~~ Yet the Act did not go far enough. It did not 
prohibit discrimination based on religion. 
2. The Race Relations Act (1968) 
In 1968 the second Race Relations Act was passed, expand- 
ing the prohibition against discrimination to the provision of 
goods, facilities and services as well as employment, housing 
and ad~ertising. '~~ However, the legislation was still defec- 
tive. Only discrimination based on color, race, or ethnic or na- 
tional origins was prohibited. Discrimination based on religion 
was not proscribed. The RRB was empowered to take cases to 
court if conciliation failed, instead of taking them to the Attor- 
ney General. A Community Relations Committee (CRC) was 
also established to promote good race relations. This second Act 
was much influenced by U.S. race legislation and was passed 
partly because of the violent riots in Watts in Los Angeles and 
the other American cities in the mid-1960s. The limitations of 
this second Act became apparent when in the 1972 Zeskol% 
131. Applin v. Race Relations Board, 1975 App. Cas. 259, 286 (Lord Simon). 
132. Discrimination "in places of public resort" was defined in Section 1 and 
"in the disposal of tenancies" in Section 5. The prohibition of incitement to racial 
hatred is found in Section 6. Section 2 of the Act established the Race Relations 
Board and Conciliation Committees, while proceedings for enforcement by the At- 
torney General were laid out in Section 3. The entire Act only had eight sections 
with a total length of five pages. 
133. Race Relations Act, 1968, ch. 71. 
134. London Borough of Ealing v. Race Relations Board, 1972 App. Cas. 342. 
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case, the House of Lords considered the meaning of the phrase 
"national origins" in a situation where a Housing Authority had 
refused to put a person of Polish nationality on the council's 
housing waiting list because he was not, as their rules re- 
quired, a British subject. 
The House of Lords held that the Race Relations Act had 
not been infringed because discrimination based upon national- 
ity was not discrimination based on "national origins." Lord 
Simon declared that "the Acts of 1965 and 1968 do not provide 
a complete code against discrimination or socially divisive pro- 
paganda. The Acts do not deal at all with discrimination on 
grounds of religion or political tenet."135 Even Lord Cross, 
who recognized that "[tlhere is no definition of 'national origins' 
in the Act and one must interpret the phrase as best one can," 
interpreted "national origins" in such a way as to reach the 
same result as his brethren.136 Even within its own limited 
terms, therefore, the relief provided by the Act was not reliable 
relief. It had surely been open to their Lordships to have con- 
strued "national origins" more liberally with parliamentary in- 
tention clearly in mind, than to construe it as narrowly as they 
did. 
3. The Race Relations Act (1976) 
This is the third and current race relations statute in Brit- 
ain. Under the 1976 Act, the Race Relations Board was re- 
placed by the Commission for Racial Equality, and the limi- 
tations of "national origins," made so apparent in the Zesko 
case, were corrected by proscribing discrimination based on 
nationality as well. The Act thus prohibited discrimination due 
to "colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins."13' 
The Act remains a race relations act, however, banning dis- 
crimination, whether direct or indirect, only on racial grounds. 
The Act contains no prohibition against discrimination on reli- 
gious grounds. Thus, to the extent the Act remains similar to 
the 1968 Act, the judgements of their Lordships in the Zesko 
case are still relevant today. 
135. Id. at 362-3. 
136. Id. at 365-6. 
137. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74. 
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C. The Threat from Facially Neutral and Generally Applica- 
ble Laws 
Laws exist for the people. People do not exist for the law. 
Laws should make exceptions for the people. People should not 
have to make exceptions for the law. For laws should only be 
an instrument for the better living of mankind. In my final 
section, I argue that law must protect human rights as its 
fundamental purpose. If it does not do this it will become op- 
pressive. Generally applicable laws that are not specifically 
targeted at individuals in the practice of their faith may be- 
come oppressive for an individual if it restricts him or her from 
living according to his or her beliefs. The international commu- 
nity is increasingly calling upon religious faiths to recognize 
and respect human rights. Religion should be about the expres- 
sion of individuality and about individual self-fulfillment. If, to 
that end, faiths have to be democratized, then they have to be 
democratized to keep up with the times. 
Yet, by the same token, a state cannot ask this of a faith if 
it is in violation of human rights itself, whether inadvertently 
or not. If a religious faith must devise and imbue itself with a 
theory of human rights, then so must the state. Unless and 
until a Religious Freedom Act is passed, exempting the applica- 
tion of generally applicable laws to the Sikhs, the state in Brit- 
ain will remain in infringement of the basic human rights of 
religious expression.ls8 Broadly, I will consider here, by way 
of example, two generally applicable laws which have 
threatened Sikhs. One is the threat posed by the requirement 
to wear crash helmets when riding motor-cycles; the other is 
the requirement to wear hard hats when working in a danger- 
ous environment. One was a domestic threat posed by British 
laws which Sikhs eventually won; the other is a European 
Community law threat which shows, as yet, no signs of abating 
for the Sikhs. 
In 1972, the British government passed the Road Traffic 
Act, Section 32 of which required any person riding a motorcy- 
138. It has not been the purpose of this paper to consider the basic human 
rights laws on religious freedoms, but reference may be made to such important 
international instruments as: Article 18 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights: 
Articles 18, 20 a d  27 of The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 1966; the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
1965; and Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950. 
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cle to wear a crash helmet.lsg No exemptions were provided. 
Sikhs affected by this well-intentioned legislation saw it as an 
assault on their religious beliefs, since wearing any headgear 
other than the turban defiles their uncut hair. Under the direc- 
tion of the Sikh temples, the Sikhs organized a protest. The 
route they chose was renowned for its success. They chose 
passive protest, courting arrest. Sikhs rode on motorcycles and 
scooters without crash-helmets and paid the penalty prescribed 
by law. Though lacking a supreme court in which to have this 
legislation reviewed, the Sikhs were able to take their protest 
to Parliament where Sidney Bidwell M.P. advocated their 
cause, arguing, as did the Sikhs, that if it was acceptable for 
the Sikhs to fight for the British Empire and again for Britain 
in two World Wars, far more perilous situations, wearing their 
turbans and not steel helmets, it should surely be acceptable 
for them to wear turbans when riding bikes. After three years, 
the Motor-Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemptions) Act 1976 
was finally passed, Section 1 of which amended Section 32 of 
the original Act to read: "A requirement imposed by regulations 
under this section (whenever made) shall not apply to any 
follower of the Sikh Religion while he is wearing a turban."'* 
Such a dispensation is, unfortunately, still awaited by 
Sikhs who work on building sites. In this area, the threat has 
come from Europe with its European Convention on Human 
Rights, which recognizes the right to religious freedom in Arti- 
cle 19 (akin to a written constitution and the closest document 
Britain has to such), and its Court at Strasbourg (akin to a 
constitutional court). Ironically, the legislation is once again 
well-intentioned. The legislation, laid down by the European 
Council, sets minimum requirements for personal protective 
equipment at work. Included is a requirement that everyone on 
nonconstruction sites wear helmets. The British government, in 
sections 11 and 12 of the Employment Act of 1989 provided 
exemptions for Sikhs from the construction helmets mandate. 
The EC Directive, however, forced Britain to require, in its Per- 
sonal Protective Equipment at  Work Regulations of 1992, the 
wearing of helmets in non-construction sites.14' 
139. Road TraEc Act, 1988, ch. 52 8 16 (1988). 
140. For a full account, see SM)NEY BIDWELL MP., THE TURBAN VICTORY (2d 
ed. 1987). 
141. The regulations were necessary to implement six European Community di- 
rectives on health and safety at work. They were also part of a continuing modern- 
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The British Sikh community is seeking exemption on non- 
construction areas, where the risk of injury is obviously lower 
than construction areas. Conferences have been ordered by city 
Sikh Tem~1es . l~~ The concern is not just over the impact of 
the new safety rules on the wearing of the Sikh turban, but 
over reduced chances of promotion, job losses, and even limited 
career choices for those who refuse to comply with the new 
rules. Despite these concerns, the regulations went into effect 
on January 1, 1993. This example clearly illustrates the need 
for specific religious freedom legislation. In fact, it is now abun- 
dantly clear that even Mandla does not provide protection for 
the Sikhs.143 
D. The Absence of a Specific Religious Freedom Category 
The foregoing analysis begs the question, why was a specif- 
ic religious freedom category not included in the Act? This is 
especially so given that some categories that do exist in the act, 
such as color and national origins, have no necessary natural 
affinity with each other. In fact, i t  would have been no difficult 
matter to have inserted a religious clause as well. At least that 
would have had the merit of ascribing to the Act some consis- 
tency or integrity of purpose.14 
Lord Templeman, in the Mandla case discussed below, 
supposed that Parliament chose not to include religious dis- 
crimination in the Race Relations Act because Parliament "con- 
sidered that the amount of discrimination on religious grounds 
does not constitute a severe burden on members of religious 
groups."" Yet, it is clear from this essay that religious dis- 
ization of existing United Kingdom law. The EC directives themselves formed part 
of a program of action on health and safety in the move towards a single Europe- 
an market. They had been developed under Article 118A which was specially added 
to the Treaty of Rome for this purpose. 
142. Over 500 delegates attended, from Sikh temples in London, Birmingham, 
Bedford, Luton, Leeds, Bristol, Cardiff, Leicester and Maidenhead, a British Sikh 
Federation Conference in Slough on November 29, 1992 to discuss this matter. Also 
City Councillor Piara Singh of Leicester has spoken out. See Vasant Kalyani & 
Deepa Pathi, Sikh Job Fear Over EC Rules: Government Action Call Over Rules, 
LEICESTER MERCURY, November 3, 1992, a t  1. 
143. Mandla is the leading case on Sikh religious rights and is discussed infia 
part 1V.E. 
144. For instance, in many international instruments on discrimination, racial 
and religious discrimination go hand in hand. 
145. Mandla v. Dowell Lee, [I9831 2 App. Cas. 548, 568 (Lord Templeman). 
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crimination does severely burden members of religious groups 
today. 
An unsuccessful attempt had been made in Parliament to 
prohibit religious discrimination in the 1976 Act but the gov- 
ernment argued that issues peculiar to religion would arise and 
that religious discrimination should be addressed in a separate 
bill.'& No separate religious discrimination bill has ever been 
passed, however. 
E. Mandla and "Ethnic Origins" 
The inadequacy of the current race relations legislation, in 
the absence of a special religious freedom law, to protect rights 
that are not racial but quintessentially religious, became strik- 
ingly apparent in what is generally regarded as the most im- 
portant case on religious freedom in modern Britain: the 
Mandla case.14' It demonstrates that the "ethnic origins" 
category, although the most elastic in the race relations legisla- 
tion, is in the long-term, ill-suited to protecting religious free- 
doms because race is an element of ethnicity and thus, only a 
few minority religions will qualify as races, even though the 
Sikhs did in this case. 
In Mandla, the Commission for Racial Equality brought 
proceedings against the headmaster of a private school for 
refusing admission to a Sikh boy, Mandla, who, contrary to 
school rules, would have had to wear a turban. The case was 
based on the new Race Relations Act 1976. The Mandla case 
could, legally, only be dealt with under race relations legisla- 
tion. The inappropriateness of this became plain as the head- 
master of the school argued that he had not meant to discrimi- 
nate on racial grounds. His school had 300 pupils 
of whom over 200 were English, five were Sikhs, 34 Hindus, 
16 Persians, six Negroes, seven Chinese and 15 from Europe- 
an countries. The reasons for having a school uniform were 
largely reasons of practical convenience-to minimize external 
differences between races and social classes, to discourage the 
"competitive fashions" which he said tend to exist in a teen- 
age community, and present a Christian image of the school 
to 
146. See HOUSE OF COMMONS, STANDING COMMITTEE A, April 29, 1976 and 
May 4, 1976, a t  cols. 84118. 
147. Mandla [I9831 2 App. Cas. 548. 
148. Id. at 566 (Lord Fraser). 
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The High Court upheld the boy's right to be admitted to the 
school. The Court of Appeal, with Lord Denning presiding, 
overturned the High Court on the grounds that the headmaster 
was not guilty of racial discri~nination.'~~ The House of Lords 
overturned the Court of Appeal.lsO 
The House of Lords decision was not based on any general 
right to religious liberty (because none exists in English law) 
but on the fact that the "no turban rule" violated the RRA 1976 
requirement that such a rule must be justifiable "irrespective of 
the color, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins of that 
person to whom it is applied."lsl The headmaster had argued, 
in the words of Lord Fraser, that, "the turban is objectionable 
just because it is a manifestation of the . . . appellants ethnic 
origins."152 The headmaster also regarded the turban "as an 
outward manifestation of a non-Christian faith. Indeed he re- 
garded it as amounting to a challenge to their faith." Even 
though Lord Fraser sympathized with the headmaster's argu- 
ment and "would have been glad to find that the no-turban rule 
was justified within the meaning of the statute," he felt that it 
could not be justified under existing legislation.ls3 
The importance of this decision for religious liberty lies in 
the elastic meaning that the House of Lords gave to "ethnic ori- 
gins" to enable the Act to give protection to religious minorities. 
This at once demonstrates the artificiality of these categories 
as far as religious freedom is concerned. Lord Fraser found that 
the Sikhs would qualify as an ethnic group because the term 
"ethnic" has come to be commonly used in a sense appreciably 
wider than the strictly racial or biological. According to Lord 
Fraser, this wider definition is "consistent with the ordinary 
experience of those who read newspapers at the present day. In 
my opinion, the word 'ethnic' still retains a racial flavour but it 
is nowadays used in an extended sense."lM 
For a group to be ethnic, continued Lord Fraser, it must be 
regarded by others "as a distinct community by virtue of cer- 
tain characteristics" of which some are essential and others are 
149. 1983 Q.B. 1. 
150. Mandla, [I9831 2 App. Cas. 548. 
151. This is the provision of "indirect discrimination" in section l(b)(ii) of the 
1976 Act. It is to be noted that the wearing of turbans is de regeur for orthodox 
Sikhs. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
152. Mandla, [I9831 2 App. Cas. at 566 (Lord Fraser). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 562. 
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not.ls5 The essential characteristics are "(1) a long shared his- 
tory, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from 
other groups, and the memory of which keeps it alive [and] (2) 
a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social cus- 
toms and manners, often but not necessarily associated with 
religious obser~ance."'~~ Nonessential but relevant factors 
include: 
(3) either a common geographical origin, or descent from a 
small number of common ancestors; (4) a common language, 
not necessarily peculiar to the group; (5) a common literature 
peculiar to the group; (6) a common religion different from 
that of the neighbouring groups or from the general communi- 
ty surrounding it; (7) being a minority or being an oppressed 
or a dominant group within a larger comm~nity.'~' 
Based on these factors, Lord Fraser expressly endorsed the 
finding of the judge of first instance that: 
[tlhe evidence shows that Sikhs are a distinctive and self- 
conscious community. They have a history going back to the 
15th century. They have a written language which a small 
proportion of Sikhs can read but which can be read by a much 
higher proportion of Sikhs than Hindus. They were a t  one 
time politically supreme in the P ~ n j a b . ' ~ ~  
In adopting this conclusion, Lord Fraser was influenced and 
"greatly strengthened" by the decision in the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal in the case of King-Ansell v. Police, in which 
Judge Richardson held that, "a group is identifiable in terms of 
its ethnic origins if it is a segment of the population distin- 
guished from others by sufficient combination of shared cus- 
toms, beliefs, traditions and characteristics derived from a 
common or presumed past."lsg 
Under this definition of "ethnic", Sikhs were given "the 
protection which Parliament evidently intended the Act to 
afford to them."160 Lord Templeman agreed that the Sikhs 




158. Id. at 565. 
159. King-Ansell v. Police, [I9721 2 N.Z.L.R., 531. It is interesting how often 
the British Courts look to other jurisdictions for assistance on these matters. 
160. Mandla, [I9831 2 App. Cas. at 565 (Lord Fraser). 
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that "ethnic" includes racial elements. He thus demonstrated 
some of the elusive difficulties of using a racial discrimination 
act to proscribe religious discrimination. He obsenred, 
for the purposes of the [Race Relations Act] a group of per- 
sons defined by reference to ethnic origins must possess some 
of the characteristics of a race, namely group descent, a group 
of geographical origin and a group history. The evidence 
shows that Sikhs satisfy these tests. They are more than a 
religious sect, they are almost a race and almost a nation. As 
a race, the Sikhs share a common color, and a common phy- 
sique based on common ancestors from that part of the 
Punjab which is centered on Amritsar. They fail to qualify as 
a separate race because in racial origin prior to the inception 
of Sikhism they cannot be distinguished from other inhabit- 
ants of the Punjab. As a nation the Sikhs defeated the Mo- 
guls, and established a kingdom in the Punjab which they 
lost as result of the first and second Sikh wars; they fail to 
qualify as a separate nation or as a separate nationality be- 
cause their kingdom never achieved a sufEcient degree of 
recognition and permanence. The Sikhs qualify as a group 
defined by ethnic origins because they constitute a separate 
and distinct community derived from the racial characteristics 
I have mentioned.l6l 
Lord Fraser similarly noted that the term "ethnic" includes 
a racial element. He recognized that the Odord English Dictio- 
nary (1897) defined "ethnic" as "[plertaining to race" and that 
the term "conveys a flavour of race."lB2 He also acknowledged 
that "the briefest glance at  the evidence . . . is enough to show 
that, within the human race, there are few, if any, distinctions 
which are scientifically recognized as racial."lB3 The Sikhs, for 
example, are no more a racial group than the Jews, which 
illustrates that the "ethnic origins" analysis is distinctly un- 
helpful. The Jews have been the most persecuted minority in 
history on account of their alleged race, yet Jewish tradition 
maintains that the Messiah will come through David, whose 
mother, Ruth, was a Moabite convert to Judaism-the clearest 
evidence that racial purity is no part of Judaism.lM 
161. Id. at 569 (Lord Templeman). 
162. Id. at 562 (Lord Fraser). 
163. Id. at 561 (Lord kaser). 
164. In Seide v. Gillette Indus., 1980 I.R.L.R. 427, 430, the absence of discrim- 
ination on religious grounds from the 1976 Act had raised the question whether 
Jews were protected by it. In debate on the first 1965 Act, the Home Secretary 
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It is submitted that what distinguishes Jews from others is 
what distinguishes Sikhs from others, and that is their faith 
and the history of their faith. Jews bear the physical character- 
istics of their place of origin. Scandinavian Jews look like Scan- 
dinavians, Chinese Jews look like Chinese, Moroccan Jews look 
like Moroccans and Indian Jews look like Indians. Similarly, 
the Sikhs look like other people from the Punjab with whom 
they share a common ancestry. Clearly neither the Jews or the 
Sikhs are a race. Consequently, they cannot rely on the race 
relations legislation for protection against discrimination. 
Though the Race Relations Act was intended to shield Sikhs 
from discrimination, because the Act did not intend to proscribe 
religious discrimination, the Act provides only unreliable secu- 
rity for Sikhs' religious liberties. 
Cases subsequent to Mandla have permitted discrimina- 
tion against Sikhs, thus illustrating the inadequacy of the pro- 
tection afforded by the Race Relations Act. For example, an 
Industrial Tribunal recently held that British Steel General 
Steels, could l a f i l l y  dismiss an orthodox Sikh for refusal to 
wear a hard hat over his turban,16' and a Sikh employed at a 
British Rail Engineering Workshop was demoted for failure to 
wear a b~rnp-cap.'~~ Both these cases have echoes of a pre- 
Mandla case where the Court of Appeal held that a rule forbid- 
ding the wearing of beards in a chocolate factory was justifiable 
was clear that "[ilt is certainly the intention of the Government that people of 
Jewish faith should be covered." See HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES, May 3, 1965, 
a t  cols. 932-3. However, Mr. N. St. JohnStevas (a constitutional expert and now a 
peer) believed that "the Jewish identity is essentially a religious one." See HOUSE 
OF COMMONS, TANDING C O ~ E  B, May 27, 1965, a t  col. 70. When the Home 
Secretary, Sir Frank Soskice, was asked what the word "ethnic" contributed to the 
expression "color, race or ethnic or national origins," he replied: 
We have chosen that connotation of words to try to ensure that we in- 
clude every possible minority group in the country . . . We hope, by the 
use of the word 'ethnic' to cover everybody who is neither of a particular 
national origin nor of a particular racial origin but who would be distin- 
guishable by color. 
Id. While the Act thus intended to protect Sikhs from discrimination, the Act clear- 
ly did not intend to proscribe religious discrimination, whether ethnically defined or 
not. 
165. S.S. Dhanjal v. British Steel General Steels, Industrial Tribunal Case No. 
50740/91 (December 11, 1993) (unreported). 
166. Safety Rules Justifv Turban Discrimination: Kuldeep Singh v. British Rail 
Engineering Ltd., THE TIMES (London), August 6, 1985. It was after this case that 
the British Sikh Federation was able to get an exemption from the Government in 
section 11 of the Employment Act 1989 which required the wearing of hard hats 
on constmction sites. 
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under the RRA on hygienic grounds even though it affected 
Sikhs more directly than others."' Clearly Mandla and the 
racial relations legislation have proved an insufficient barrier 
to infringements on religious liberties. 
Britain urgently needs an express affirmation of the 
individual's right to religious liberty. Britain needs this in the 
form of a religious freedom statute that places the onus upon 
the state to show a compelling interest for any encroachment 
upon a person's religious expression.168 Such legislation 
would be compatible with Britain's tradition of effecting consti- 
tutional change through ordinary statutes passed in Parlia- 
ment?' The Sikh right to religious freedom will not be se- 
cure unless such legislation is passed. Britain's experience with 
the three Race Relations Acts demonstrates that race relations 
legislation is of little avail unless it is coupled with legislation 
to protect religious liberty.'" 
Racial and ethnic justice must go hand in hand with reli- 
gious justice. Without the one, the other will be less effective. 
Racial and ethnic minorities are often also religious minorities. 
In this, Britain's experience has mirrored that of America. 
Smith concerned Native Indians;17' Yang in 1990 concerned 
the H~nong; '~~ and Munn in 1991 involved &can-Ameri- 
cans.lT3 In Britain, ethnic minority groups, such as the Sikhs, 
have figured prominently in religious freedom cases.'" How- 
ever, the comparison between these two countries also shows 
that if the device of a Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA) was deemed necessary in a country like America, it is 
deemed doubly necessary in Britain. 
In America the RFRA applies a uniform standard to all 
faiths, confemng no particular advantage or disadvantage on 
any faith or any state intere~t.'?~ In Britain, the inequality is 
167. Panesar v. Nestle Co., 1980 I.C.R. 144. 
168. See supra introduction. 
169. See supra parts III.B.l-6. 
170. See supm parts 1V.C-E. (discussing difficulties and uncertainties). 
171. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 US.  872 (1990). 
172. Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990). 
173. Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 277 
(1991). 
174. See supm notes 163-165. 
175. The reader is referred again to the wording of the RFRk See supra note 
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already formally enshrined in law.lT6 One faith is already fa- 
vored over another. State interest already predominates over 
religion.17' In these circumstances, the need for religious free- 
dom legislation is far greater in Britain. The Sikh example is a 
testament to that. Britain has had a long and illustrious histo- 
ry. It has contributed handsomely to the constitutional rights 
and liberties of many countries. But the Sikh experience shows 
that seams in the fabric of British constitutional law are begin- 
ning to separate. 
To counteract this trend, Britain will inevitably need for 
the long term to reduce to writing its unwritten rules, and in 
the process, modernize its system. This would be a perfectly 
logical step in Britain's historical progression-unless history is 
to be allowed to stand still. Britain had a Bill of Rights in 1688 
that suited the exigencies of its day, and Britain had a consti- 
tutional framework in Cromwell's Instrument of Government in 
1653 and still has such a framework in the Union with Scot- 
land Acts. The logical step is to update the Bill of Rights and 
build on the constitutional framework as Britain moves to 
closer union with the European Communities on an entirely 
new footing. 
In Britain's present system, it is easier to pass religious 
freedom legislation. The RRA is not able to do this work. For 
the Sikhs, Mandla was the high-point of protection of their 
religious freedom. Yet as a vehicle for promoting their religious 
rights, Mandla was, and still remains, defective even though 
the language of their Lordships was an accolade to the Sikhs as 
a people. What is needed is specific legislation on religious 
liberty in Britain like the RFRA in America. Law is a precise 
science and the precise recognition of legal rights is important 
in this area. Race relations legislation is a poor substitute, and 
its tortuous extension into this area only underscores the 
state's inability to distinguish between racial issues and reli- 
gious issues in a country where one religion alone has the full 
sanction of the law as the established church of the state. 
25. 
176. The clearest example of this is the Union with Scotland Acts. See supra 
part III.B.6. 
177. The state in Britain will never have to justify why it has taken action 
that indirectly infringes religious rights. There is no onus on it to show a compel- 
ling interest. An example of this is seen in the discussion of the Road Traf3ic Act 
1972. See supra pp. 43-44. 
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As for the Act of Settlement of 1700, this is bound to be 
repealed one day, and that day is likely to be sooner rather 
than later. What makes the Act impossible is not simply the 
fact that Britain now has a political system that makes reli- 
gious discrimination by the state unacceptable, but the fact 
that a natural heir to the throne may become ineligible purely 
for reasons of religious faith if he marries a Catholic.'" Ironi- 
cally, this issue is far more likely to catalyze change in Britain 
than any concern over Sikh religious rights.17g Yet it is clear 
that constitutional reform is inevitable in Britain and it is 
inevitable for purely practical reasons of this kind. 
178. This is proscribed for in a series of statutes from the seventeenth centu- 
ry. See supra parts III.B.l-4. The separation of Prince Charles from Princess Diana 
and the divorce of Mrs. Camilla Parker-Bowles, a Catholic, from her husband-with 
whom Prince Charles has been linked-lays open the possibility that the Prince 
may eventually want to many her. This is something which under existing law he 
cannot do. The severest restraint on the right of any member of the Royal Family 
to marry, divorce and re-marry is imposed by the Royal Marriages Act 1772 (12 
Geo. 3 ch. 1). 
179. There has been widespread concern in the British media about the possi- 
bility of a potential monarch marrying a Catholic. See THE INDEPENDENT (London), 
December 10, 1993; THE TIMES (London), December 8, 1993; and THE GUARDIAN 
(London), January 7, 1995. 
